Torture and moral integrity : a philosophical enquiry /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Kramer, Matthew H., 1959- author.
Imprint:	Oxford, United Kingdom ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2014.
Description:	xv, 339 pages ; 24 cm
Language:	English
Subject:	Torture -- Moral and ethical aspects. Punishment -- Moral and ethical aspects. Punishment -- Moral and ethical aspects Torture -- Moral and ethical aspects.
Format:	Print Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/10043497

Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:	9780198714200 0198714203
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 317-325) and index.
Summary:	This text is about the wrongness of torture and the nature of morality. It discusses multiple types of torture with great philosophical acuity and it seeks to explain why interrogational torture and other types of torture are always and everywhere morally wrong. At the same time, it rigorously plumbs the general structure of morality and the intricacies of moral conflicts and it probes some of the chief grounds for the moral illegitimacy of various modes of conduct. It sophisticatedly defends a deontological conception of morality against some subtle critiques that have been mounted during the past few decades by proponents of consequentialism. The book tackles a concrete moral problem: a problem that has been heatedly debated during recent years in the governmental and military institutions of many countries as well as in academic circles. At the same time it tackles some very abstract issues in moral and political philosophy. Moreover, as becomes apparent at numerous junctures, the abstract ruminations and the concrete prescriptions are closely connected: Kramer's recommendations concerning the legal consequences of the perpetration of torture by public officials or private individuals, for example, are based squarely on his more abstract accounts of the nature of torture and the nature of morality. His philosophical reflections on the structure of morality are the vital background for his approach to torture, and his approach to torture is a natural outgrowth of those philosophical reflections.

Table of Contents:

1. Introduction I: Moral Conflicts and Deontology
1.1. Moral Conflicts
1.1.1. The disambiguation of some key concepts
1.1.1.1. Two senses of 'prima facie'
1.1.1.2. Weak permissibility versus strong permissibility
1.1.1.2.1. Two types of obligations and two types of permissibility
1.1.1.2.2. Infringements versus violations
1.1.1.3. Strong justification versus weak justification
1.1.1.4. Two senses of 'rightness'
1.1.1.5. Two senses of 'absolute'
1.1.1.6. Overtopping versus overriding
1.1.2. Chariness of moral conflicts
1.1.2.1. Consequentialist balancing
1.1.2.2. The objectivity of morality
1.1.2.3. Logical incoherence
1.1.2.4. Moral conflicts and action-guidance
1.1.2.5. Concerns about fairness or excessive onerousness
1.2. The Deontology/Consequentialism Distinction and the General Structure of Morality
1.2.1. The division between deontology and consequentialism
1.2.1.1. Intrinsic moral statuses
1.2.1.2. Agent-neutrality versus agent-centredness
1.2.1.3. Absolute prohibitions
1.2.2. The general structure of morality
1.2.2.1. Moore's tripartite account
1.2.2.2. An alternative account of morality
1.2.2.3. A pithy conclusion: some differences between the accounts of morality
2. Introduction II: What is Torture?
2.1. Definitional Ventures
2.1.1. Convention against Torture
2.1.1.1. A few queries
2.1.1.2. Some commendations
2.1.2. The American definition
2.1.3. Amnesty International's definition
2.1.4. Philosophers' definitions
2.1.4.1. Michael Davis on the ordeal of torture
2.1.4.1.1. A first query: the helplessness of victims
2.1.4.1.2. A second query: testing the victim's capacity to endure suffering
2.1.4.1.3. A third query: psychological torture revisited
2.1.4.1.4. A fourth query: against the victim's will
2.1.4.1.5. A final query: indifference to the victim's welfare
2.1.4.2. Kershnar's formulation
2.1.4.3. Miller and the complexities of torture
2.1.4.3.1. The third clause
2.1.4.3.2. The second clause
2.1.4.4. Sussman and the difficulties of defining torture
2.1.4.4.1. A preliminary point: a problematic addition
2.1.4.4.2. A matter of consent
2.1.5. Some of the lessons of this survey of definitions
2.2. Varieties of Torture
2.2.1. Interrogational torture
2.2.1.1. Prospective versus retrospective
2.2.1.2. Some varieties of prospective interrogational torture
2.2.1.3. Extreme emergencies
2.2.2. Placatory torture
2.2.2.1. A matter of intentions
2.2.2.2. A certain commitment
2.2.2.2.1. A first difference
2.2.2.2.1. A second difference
2.2.2.2.3. A third difference
2.2.2.2.4. A matter of importance
2.2.3. Intimidatory torture
2.2.4. Extortionate torture
2.2.5. Act-impelling torture
2.2.6. Punitive torture
2.2.7. Sadistic torture
2.2.8. Discriminatory torture
2.2.9. Humiliative torture
2.2.10. Extravagantly reckless torture
2.2.11.. Incapacitarive torture
2.2.11.1. Lastingly incapacitative torture
2.2.11.2. Ephemerally incapacitative torture
2.2.11.2.1. The actlomission dichotomy
2.2.11.2.2. Fending off the most common objection to Bennett's analysis
2.2.11.2.3. SussmanÆs example of the obese man
2.2.11.2.4. Steinhof's example of the rapist
2.2.11.2.5. Steinhoff's example of the snake bite
2.2.11.2.6. Kamm on torturing from a distance
2.2.11.2.7. From Kamm to Kantians
2.2.11.2.8. Hill and the act/omission distinction
2.2.11.2.9. Hill and the act/omission distinction redux
2.2.12. Edifying torture
2.2.12.1. Salvation-oriented torture
2.2.12.2. Therapeutic torture
2.2.12.2.1. Experimentational torture
2.2.12.2.2. Aversion therapy
2.2.12.2.3. Averting a coma
2.2.12.2.4. A worry about the conflation of distinct issues
2.2.12.3. Resistance training
2.2.13. A table of the main kinds of torture
2.3. Conclusion: An Overview
2.3.1. The infliction of severe pain
2.3.1.1. Torture versus attempted torture
2.3.1.1.1. A different question
2.3.1.1.2. A question put aside
2.3.1.1.3. A matter of gravity
2.3.1.1.4. Back to the definition
2.3.1.2. How long?
2.3.2. Against the interests of the victim?
2.3.3. Consent and control
2.3.3.1. Two caveats about control
2.3.3.2. The upshot of the matter
2.3.4. A definition of torture
3. Why Torture is Wrong
3.1. Some Previous Accounts of the Wrongness of Torture
3.1.1. Contractarian approaches
3.1.1.1. Nagel and justifiability
3.1.1.2. Meisels and the social-contract tradition
3.1.1.2.1. A terse critique
3.1.1.2.2. A possible reply
3.1.1.2.3. Another possible reply
3.1.2. Shue on the defencelessness of victims
3.1.2.1. Putting aside an issue
3.1.2.2. On defencelessness as the wrong-making property of torture
3.1.2.3. A loss of one's ideals?
3.1.2.3.1. A query
3.1.2.3.2. Another query
3.1.3. Shue and others on the spread of torture
3.1.3.1. A weak argument
3.1.3.2. Another weak a-rgument
3.1.3.2.1. A first reply
3.1.3.2.2. A second reply
3.1.3.3. Empirical speculations and slippery slopes
3.1.3.3.1. Two clarifications
3.1.3.3.2. An additional clarification
3.1.3.3.3. A first example
3.1.3.3.4. A second example
3.1.3.3.5. A first objection
3.1.3.3.6. A second objection: preliminary clarifications
3.1.3.3.7. A second objection continued: the meagreness of the evidence
3.1.3.3.8. A closing caveat
3.1.4. From consequentialism to Kantianism: torture and agency
3.1.4.1. Waldron on torture and dignity
3.1.4.2. Sussman on the limits of Kantianism
3.1.5. Sussman on torture and self-betrayal
3.1.5.1. Techniques of torturous self-betrayal
3.1.5.2. The source of the self-betrayal
3.1.5.3. Some transitional ruminations on Sussman's theory
3.2. Why Torture is Wrong
3.2.1. 'Ibe consumingness of severe pain
3.2.1.1. The consumingness of euphoria
3.2.1.2. Some observations by philosophers and other theorists
3.2.1.2.1. Beccaria on the filling of the sensory field
3.2.1.2.2. Luban on the tyranny of severe pain
3.2.1.2.3. Kreimer on the occupation of the self
3.2.1.2.4. Scarry on the body in severe pain
3.2.1.3. The perils of overstatement
3.2.1.3.1. Preliminary remarks
3.2.1.3.2. Hyperbole best avoided
3.2.2. Combining two insights
3.2.2.1. The two main strands
3.2.2.2. The combination
3.2.2.2.1. Not enough in isolation
3.2.2.2.2. Morally vitiating purposes
3.2.2.2.3. The Minimal Invasion Principle
3.2.2.2.4. Consequentialist calculations
3.2.2.2.5. Agony and oppression: the factors of consent and control afresh
3.2.2.2.6. Some implications: edifying torture and sado-masochism
3.2.2.2.7. Some implications: the problem of animals
3.2.2.2.8. Agony and oppression redux: a recapitulation and a transition
3.2.3. A perpetrator-focused perspective
3.2.3.1. Monstrous victims of torture
3.2.3.2. Being killed versus being tortured
3.2.3.3. An additional perspective
3.2.3.3.1. A perpetrator-focused justificatory basis
3.2.3.3.2. A first query: why is ephemerally incapacitative torture everpermissible?
3.2.3.3.3. Four caveats concerning my response to the if qrst uery
3.2.3.3.4. A second query: why is deliberate killing ever morallpermissible?y
3.2.3.3.5. Clarifinthe issueyg
3.2.3.3.6. A third query: why is highly restrictive confinement ever morally permissible?
3.2.3.3.7. A fourth query; why is punitive torture absolutely wrong?
3.2.3.3.8. Retributivism and the perpetrator-focused perspective
3.2.3.3.9. A fifth query: why is consensual placatory torture impermissible?
3.2.3.3.10. A final query: why is sado-masochistic torture morally wrong?
3.3. Moral Optimality without Moral Permissibility
3.3.1. A first example
3.3.2. A second example
3.3.3. Some general considerations
3.3.3.1. Harshness and protractedness
3.3.3.2. The exigencies of an emergency
3.3.3.3. Threateningness and responsibility
3.3.3.4. Probable efficacy
3.3.3.5. Legal sanctions
4. The Rationality of Deontological Constraints
4.1. Placatory Torture and the Unremittingness of Deontological Duties
4.1.1. A thought-experiment: sparing someone from a greater wrong
4.1.2. The significance of the thought-experiment
4.1.3. The moral upshot
4.1.3.1. The factor of consent
4.1.3.2. The orientation of the torture
4.1.3.3. Perpetrator-focused reflections
4.1.3.4. Moral optimality
4.2. Are Deontological Constraints Irrational?
4.2.1. Rationality and maximization
4.2.2. Deontological commitments
4.2.3. Slippage from none-versus-any to fewer-versus-more
4.2.3.2. A first example of the conflation
4.2.3.2. A second example
4.2.3.3. Goals for deontologists: a first example
4.2.3.4. Goals for deontologists: a second example 237
4.2.4. The maximizing conception of rationality redux
4.2.5. A return to moral optimality
5. Legal Responses to Torture
5.1. Legal Approval Ex Ante?
5.1.1. Dershowitz and torture warrants
5.1.1.1. A first objection to Dershowitz: inapposite comparisons
5.1.1.2. A second objection to Dershowitz: a missing prohibition
5.1.1.3. A third objection to Dershowitz: inordinate narrowing of the options
5.1.1.3.1. A shortcoming in Dershowitz's reply
5.1.1.3.2. A possible response by Dershowitx
5.1.1.3.3. A second possible response by Dershowitz
5.1.1.3.4. Peculiarly worrisome problems
5.1.1.3.5. A first rejoinder to Dershowitz: torture without warrants
5.1.1.3.6. A second rejoinder to Dershowitz: arguments in tension
5.1.1.3.7. The second rejoinder to Dershowitz continued
5.1.1.3.8. The second rejoinder to Dershowitz completed
5.1.1.3.9. A third rejoinder to Dershowitz: ways of dealing with the problems
5.1.1.3.10.. A third rejoinder to Dershowitz continued
5.1.1.3.11. A third rejoinder to Dershowitz completed
5.1.1.4. A fourth objection to Dershowitz: seeking support from a strange quarter
5.1.1.5. A final objection to Dershowitz: a matter of moral principle
5.1.2. Posner and Vermeule on the regulation of torture
5.1.2.1. Posner and Vermeule on deontological absolutism
5.1.2.1.1. Missed distinctions and an inapposite focus
5.1.2.1.2. A charge of fanaticism and an easy target
5.1.2.1.3. Tragic choices as moral conflicts
5.1.2.2. Posner and Vermeule on the Legal Prohibition Thesis
5.1.2.2.1. Empirical conjectures
5.1.2.2.2. Exoneration is tantamount to approval
5.1.2.2.3. Not many operational differences
5.1.2.2.4. An objection of moral principle
5.1.2.2.5. Further remarks on the symbolism of authorizations of interrogational torture
5.1.2.3. The analogy between torture and killing
5.1.3. Legitimate techniques of interrogation
5.1.3.1. Waldron's distrustful arguments
5.1.3.2. A partial rejoinder to Waldron
5.2. Legal Accountability Ex Post
5.2.1. Which defences?
5.2.1.1. Mitigations rather than justifications or excuses
5.2.1.2. Two preliminary caveats
5.2.1.3. Necessity or protection-of-oneself-or-others?
5.2.1.4. A residual role for the defence of duress
5.2.2. Which sanctions?
5.2.2.1. Criminal sanctions imposed on individual officials
5.2.2.2. Civil sanctions applid te o individual officials
5.2.2.3. Institutional sanctions against individual officials
5.2.2.4. Collectively borne sanctions
5.2.3. Private individuals as defendants
5.2.3.1. Collective responsibiilty
5.2.3.2. Some public/private similarities relating to individually borne sanctions
5.2.3.3. Some publiclprivate differences relating to individually borne sanctions
5.2.3.3.1. An example already encountered
5.2.3.3.2. A second example
5.2.3.3.3. Sado-masochistic torture once more
5.2.3.3.4. A rejoinder?
5.2.3.3.5. Sado-masochistic torture and the harm principle
5.3. The Complexities of Involvement
5.3.1. Extradition, deportation, and extraordinary rendition
5.3.2. Evidence proded by interrogational torture
5.3.3. Article 3 and Airtcle 15 conjoined
5.4. Conclusion
References
Index

Torture and moral integrity : a philosophical enquiry /

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