Sexual exploitation and abuse by UN military contingents : moving beyond the current "status quo" and responsibility under international law /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Burke, Róisín Sarah, author.
Imprint:Leiden ; Boston : Brill Nijhoff, ©2014.
Description:xx, 382 pages ; 25 cm.
Language:English
Series:International Humanitarian Law Series, 1389-6776 ; volume 42
International humanitarian law series ; 42.
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/10086442
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Varying Form of Title:Sexual exploitation and abuse by United Nations military contingents
ISBN:9789004208476 (hbk.)
900420847X (hbk.)
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 323-376) and index.
Summary:In this book Róisín Burke explores the legal, conceptual and practical difficulties of dealing with sexual offences committed by military contingent personnel deployed on UN peace operations. Some of the inadequacies of current legal frameworks for dealing with such abuses are examined. The book addresses the difficulties with applying international humanitarian law, human rights law and/or international criminal law in this context, and the broader issue of state/international organization responsibility. The book proposes policy options to increase accountability both for perpetrators and for troop contributing nations otherwise indifferent to the crimes of their national contingents --
Table of Contents:
  • Abstract
  • Preface
  • Acknowledgments
  • List of Acronyms and Abbreviations
  • Introduction
  • A. SEA - The Problem
  • B. Statement of Research Questions and Study's Limitations
  • C. Methodology
  • D. Chapter Outline
  • E. Scope of Study, its Context and Purpose
  • Chapter I. Background - Current Accountability Framework and UN Initiatives
  • A. UN Standards of Conduct and the Prohibition of SEA
  • 1. Secretary General's 2003 Bulletin
  • 2. Codes of Conduct 32 B UN Response to SEA
  • 1. UN Security Council Resolutions
  • 2. Task Force on Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
  • 3. Conduct and Discipline Unit and Teams
  • 4. Training
  • 5. Victim Assistance
  • 6. Mission Specific and Other Measures
  • 7. Investigative and Disciplinary Procedures and the Revised MOU
  • a. Past Investigative Procedures
  • b. Revised Model MOU
  • i. Standards of Conduct
  • ii. Investigations
  • iii. State Assurances
  • iv. Command Responsibility
  • v. Paternity Claims
  • vi. Impact of Revisions to the Model MOU on SEA
  • C. Conclusion
  • Chapter II. Status of Forces and Jurisdictional Immunity
  • A. Status of Forces
  • B. Jurisdictional Immunities
  • 1. Theoretical Basis for the Grant of Jurisdictional Immunities
  • a. Visiting Forces - Doctrine of the Law of the Flag
  • b. Diplomatic Privileges and Immunities
  • c. Functional Necessity
  • i. UN Officials
  • ii. UN Experts on Mission
  • iii. Waiver of Immunity
  • iv. Nature and Extent of Immunities
  • C. Host State Consent and Customary International Law
  • 1. Host State Consent
  • D. Conclusion
  • Chapter III. Applicability of International Law and SEA by UMC Personnel
  • A. Applicability of IHL to UMCs and SEA
  • 1. Applicability of IHL to UMCs
  • 2. Obligations Imposed under IHL
  • 3. IHL and Protection against SEA
  • 4. Conclusion
  • B. Applicability of Human Rights Law
  • 1. Applicability of IHRL to the UN
  • 2. Transitional Administration
  • C. Extraterritorial Human Rights Obligations of TCCs
  • 1. The Approach of the HRC and ICJ - ICCPR and its Optional Protocol
  • a. HRC - Power or Effective Control
  • b. HRC - State Acquiescence
  • c. HRC - 'Subject-matter' Jurisdiction
  • d. ICJ - Occupation and/or Effective Control over Persons
  • e. Application of ICCPR to TCC Extraterritorial Acts or Omissions and SEA
  • 2. Inter-American Human Rights System
  • a. State Agent Authority
  • b. Application of IAmCommHR and IAmCrtHR's Approach to TCCs: SEA by UMC Personnel
  • 3. European Human Rights System
  • a. ECommHR- State Agent Authority (SAA) and Cause and Effect
  • b. ECrtHR - A Gradual Shift Towards a Territorial Approach
  • c. Post-Bankovic - A Gradual Shift Back to SAA or Cause and Effect Approach?
  • d. Application of ECommHR and ECrtHRs' Approaches to TCCs and SEA by UMC Personnel
  • 4. Conclusion: Extraterritorial Jurisdiction and SEA by UMC Personnel
  • D. States Obligations under IHRL Treaties towards SEA Victims
  • 1. Investigation and Prosecution
  • 2. Right to an Effective Remedy
  • 3. Due Diligence
  • E. Conclusion
  • Chapter IV. The ICC as an Avenue for the Prosecution of UMC Personnel
  • A. SEA by UMC Personnel - Chapeau Elements under the Rome Statute
  • 1. Chapeau Elements of Crimes Against Humanity
  • a. Systematic
  • b. Widespread
  • c. Mens Rea
  • d. Application to UMC personnel committing sexual offences
  • 2. Chapeau Elements of War Crimes
  • a. Chapeau Elements
  • b. Application to UMC Personnel Committing Sexual Offences
  • B. Further Restrictions in the Rome Statute
  • 1. Triggering Mechanisms
  • 2. Other Restrictions
  • C. Gravity Threshold
  • 1. Quantitative
  • 2. Impact of crimes
  • 3. Social Alarm
  • 4. Perpetrator's Seniority and Role in Crime
  • 5. Manner of Commission
  • 6. Conclusion
  • D. Complementarity and its implications
  • 1. 'Genuinely' Investigate and Prosecute
  • 2. Unwillingness
  • a. Shielding
  • b. Unjustified Delay inconsistent with intent to bring to justice
  • c. Independence and Impartiality
  • d. Conclusion
  • 3. Inability
  • 4. Conclusion
  • E. State Cooperation
  • F. Positive Complementarity
  • G. Conclusion
  • Chapter V. Moving beyond the Status Quo - Alternatives for Holding UMC Personnel to Account?
  • A. Justifications for Prosecution of UMC Personnel by an Internationalized Justice Mechanism
  • 1. Deterrence
  • 2. Expressive Value
  • B. Tri-Hybrid Justice Mechanism
  • 1. GLE's Hybrid Court
  • 2. Tri-Hybrid Court
  • 3. Difficulties with tri-hybrid Model
  • C. Trial Monitoring and Onsite Courts Martial
  • D. Conclusion
  • Chapter VI. State and International Organization Responsibility
  • A. Command and Control
  • 1. Past UN Operations
  • 2. The Command and Control Predicament
  • B. Attribution of responsibility
  • 1. Jurisprudence - Tests for Attributing Conduct
  • a. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia - Overall Control
  • b. International Court of Justice - Effective Control
  • c. European Court of Human Rights
  • i. Ultimate Authority and Control
  • ii. Effective Overall Control
  • iii. Effective Control or Ultimate Authority and Control
  • d. Dutch Courts, Attribution of Responsibility - Srebrenica
  • 2. ILC Standards
  • a. Test of Effective Control
  • b. Ultra Vires Acts and 'Off-duty' Transgressions
  • c. Dual or Multiple Attribution
  • C. Consequences of Wrongful Act or Omission
  • 1. Reparation
  • a. Restitution
  • b. Compensation
  • c. Satisfaction
  • 2. Invocation of responsibility
  • D. Avenues for holding the TCC or UN to account
  • 1. Avenues for holding the UN to account
  • a. Dispute Settlement Mechanism
  • b. Domestic Courts
  • c. Standing Claims Commission and Claims Review Boards
  • d. Ombudsman
  • e. International Courts and Human Rights Monitoring Bodies
  • 2. Avenues for holding the TCC to Account
  • a. Inter-State Complaints
  • b. TCC Courts - Tort
  • c. IHRL Enforcement Mechanisms
  • E. Conclusion
  • Main Findings and Conclusions
  • Bibliography
  • Index