Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Nile : the economics of international water law /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Abebe, Daniel Y., author.
Imprint:[Chicago, Illinois] : Law School, University of Chicago, 2014.
Description:1 online resource (26 pages)
Language:English
Series:Public law and legal theory working paper ; no. 484
Public law and legal theory working paper ; no. 484.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/10116471
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Notes:"August 2014."
Includes bibliographical references.
Title from online title page (viewed January 8, 2015).
Summary:"As part of a Symposium on the book The Economic Foundations of International Law, this Article briefly compares and contrasts two distinct analytical approaches to international law - doctrinal versus economic - in the context of Egypt's and Ethiopia's dispute over the right to exploit the Nile River's water resources. The Article argues that the traditional doctrinal approach, one based solely on an examination of international water law, treaties, and customary international law is unlikely to result in a legal conclusion that either state is likely to respect because such an approach fails to consider the incentives, material capabilities, and national interests of Egypt and Ethiopia. However, the Article argues that an economics approach focusing on state preferences and incentives for compliance with international law in a world without a central enforcement mechanism will better illuminate the obstacles that Egypt and Ethiopia face and the likelihood of legal resolution of the conflict. After examining the interests and political constraints on both states, the Article concludes with a simple application of transaction costs economics, focusing on property rights and liability rules, to understand how Egypt and Ethiopia might respond to different legal arrangements designed to resolve the conflict."

MARC

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245 1 0 |a Egypt, Ethiopia, and the Nile :  |b the economics of international water law /  |c Daniel Abebe. 
264 1 |a [Chicago, Illinois] :  |b Law School, University of Chicago,  |c 2014. 
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490 1 |a Public law and legal theory working paper ;  |v no. 484 
500 |a "August 2014." 
504 |a Includes bibliographical references. 
520 |a "As part of a Symposium on the book The Economic Foundations of International Law, this Article briefly compares and contrasts two distinct analytical approaches to international law - doctrinal versus economic - in the context of Egypt's and Ethiopia's dispute over the right to exploit the Nile River's water resources. The Article argues that the traditional doctrinal approach, one based solely on an examination of international water law, treaties, and customary international law is unlikely to result in a legal conclusion that either state is likely to respect because such an approach fails to consider the incentives, material capabilities, and national interests of Egypt and Ethiopia. However, the Article argues that an economics approach focusing on state preferences and incentives for compliance with international law in a world without a central enforcement mechanism will better illuminate the obstacles that Egypt and Ethiopia face and the likelihood of legal resolution of the conflict. After examining the interests and political constraints on both states, the Article concludes with a simple application of transaction costs economics, focusing on property rights and liability rules, to understand how Egypt and Ethiopia might respond to different legal arrangements designed to resolve the conflict." 
588 |a Title from online title page (viewed January 8, 2015). 
650 0 |a Water rights  |x Economic aspects  |z Nile River Watershed. 
650 0 |a Water rights (International law)  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85145635 
650 0 |a Water resources development  |x Law and legislation  |z Egypt. 
650 0 |a Water resources development  |x Law and legislation  |z Ethiopia. 
650 7 |a Water resources development  |x Law and legislation.  |2 fast  |0 http://id.worldcat.org/fast/fst01171999 
650 7 |a Water rights  |x Economic aspects.  |2 fast  |0 http://id.worldcat.org/fast/fst01172068 
650 7 |a Water rights (International law)  |2 fast  |0 http://id.worldcat.org/fast/fst01172078 
651 7 |a Egypt.  |2 fast  |0 http://id.worldcat.org/fast/fst01208755 
651 7 |a Ethiopia.  |2 fast  |0 http://id.worldcat.org/fast/fst01205830 
651 7 |a Nile River Watershed.  |2 fast  |0 http://id.worldcat.org/fast/fst01265050 
830 0 |a Public law and legal theory working paper ;  |v no. 484. 
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