Philosophy of language : the classics explained /
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Author / Creator: | McGinn, Colin, 1950- author. |
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Imprint: | Cambridge, Massachusetts ; London, England : The MIT Press, [2015] |
Description: | x, 225 pages ; 24 cm |
Language: | English |
Subject: | |
Format: | Print Book |
URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/10132703 |
Table of Contents:
- Preface
- 1. Frege on Sense and Reference
- 1.1. Background
- 1.2. Identity
- 1.3. Additional Machinery
- 1.4. The Conception of Sense
- 1.5. Reference
- 1.6. Ordinary and Extraordinary Use
- 1.7. Further Points on Sense and Reference
- 1.8. Problems with Frege's Theory
- 1.9. Extension of Frege's Theory beyond Singular Terms
- 1.10. Further Aspects of Frege's Theory
- 2. Kripke on Names
- 2.1. Background
- 2.2. Kripke's Critique
- 2.3. Rigid Designation
- 2.4. Kripke's Epistemic Objections
- 2.5. The Causal Chain Theory
- 2.6. Objections to Kripke's Critique
- 2.7. The Social Character of Names
- 2.8. Essential Descriptions
- 2.9. Impure Descriptions
- 3. Russell on Definite Descriptions
- 3.1. Indefinite and Definite Descriptions
- 3.2. Three Theories of Definite Descriptions
- 3.3. Indefinite Descriptions and Identity
- 3.4. Russell's Rejection of Meinong's Ontology
- 3.5. The Details of Russell's Theory of Descriptions
- 3.6. Problems with Russell
- 3.7. Primary and Secondary Occurrences
- 4. Donnellan's Distinction
- 4.1. Introduction
- 4.2. Referential and Attributive Uses
- 4.3. Denoting and Referring
- 4.4. Truth-Value Gaps
- 4.5. Evaluating Donnellan's Distinction
- 4.6. Implication and Implicature
- 4.7. Further Objections to Russell's Theory
- 5. Kaplan on Demonstratives
- 5.1. Intension and Extension
- 5.2. Kaplan on Indexicals
- 5.3. The Two Principles of Indexicals
- 5.4. Context of Use and Conditions of Evaluation
- 5.5. Possible Worlds, Meaning, and Indexicals
- 5.6. Kaplan on "Today" and "Yesterday"
- 6. Evans on Understanding Demonstratives
- 6.1. The Fregean Theory of Indexicals
- 6.2. The Point of Indexicalhy
- 6.3. Evans's Theory of Sense and Reference for Indexicals
- 6.4. Saying versus Showing
- 6.5. Mock Sense
- 6.6. Empty Names
- 6.7. Evans's View of Names
- 6.8. Evans on "Today" and "Yesterday"
- 6.9. Character, Content, and Information
- 7. Putnam on Semantic Externalism
- 7.1. Background
- 7.2. Twin Earth and "Water"
- 7.3. Meanings Are Not in the Head
- 7.4. Criticisms of Putnam
- 8. Tarski's Theory of Truth
- 8.1. Background
- 8.2. Tarski's Criteria of Acceptability
- 8.3. Aristotle and the Redundancy Theory
- 8.4. Object Language and Metalanguage
- 8.5. How to Derive the T-Sentences
- 8.6. Satisfaction
- 9. Davidson's Semantics for Natural Language
- 9.1. Background
- 9.2. The Merits of Tarski's Theory as Applied to Meaning
- 9.3. Applying Tarski's Theory to Natural Languages
- 9.4. Empirical Truth Theory
- 9.5. Criticisms of Davidson's Theory
- 10. Grice's Theory of Speaker Meaning
- 10.1. Background: Speakers and Sentences
- 10.2. Two Types of Meaning
- 10.3. What Is Speaker Meaning?
- 10.4. Consequences and Criticisms
- Appendix: Kripke's Puzzle about Belief
- Notes
- Index