Review by Choice Review
Cohen and Gooch do an admirable job of showing how military failures may be analyzed to great advantage. They demonstrate that simple explanations of failures, such as blaming the generals in charge, is usually unproductive. Their thesis is that military defeat can result from problems inherent in the organizational makeup of an army or in its "systems," by which they mean its technological components. The emphasis, however, is on the organizational or institutional flaws and the failure of military leaders to adapt when these flaws become apparent. These failures are placed in various categories, such as "Failure to Learn," "Failure to Anticipate," and "Failure to Adapt." The argument is convincing and the supporting analyses are well done. Notes, bibliography, and index are good, but the proofreading is poor. The title is somewhat misleading, since all of the case studies are in the 20th century. Scholars should find the suggestions stimulating, while the material is of enough general interest that the informed public will find it worthwhile and accessible. Recommended for all libraries. -P. D. Jones, Bradley University
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Booklist Review
Two scholarly military historians attempt an analysis of the kind of military failure that results from ordinary human error, as opposed to incompetence or numerical disparities. The focus here is the twentieth century; and while the text will command more attention from those with considerable background in military history, it is, nevertheless, an extremely provocative work that can be highly recommended for larger collections. Notes; to be indexed. --Roland Green
From Booklist, Copyright (c) American Library Association. Used with permission.
Review by Library Journal Review
Military failures have long been studied piecemeal, but there are few scholarly attempts to quantify and systematize them. Here, two professors of military history reduce the study of command blunders to a science. Several intellectual shortfalls, such as the failures to learn, to anticipate, to adapt, are analyzed. Each is then followed by the study of a pivotal battle or campaign which easily could have turned out differently, but for the ``pathways to misfortune'' which intervened. The work is painstaking, detailed, and thoughtful, marred only by a ponderous writing style. It is more mature and systematic than Charles M. Fair's From the Jaws of Victory (LJ 7/71). For informed laypersons and specialists.-- Raymond L. Puffer, U.S. Air Force History Prog., Los Angeles (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
(c) Copyright Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
Review by Choice Review
Review by Booklist Review
Review by Library Journal Review
