Self-knowledge for humans /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Cassam, Quassim, author.
Edition:First edition.
Imprint:Oxford, United Kingdom ; New York, NY : Oxford University Press, 2014.
Description:xi, 238 pages ; 24 cm
Language:English
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/10371152
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Varying Form of Title:Self knowledge for humans
ISBN:9780199657575
0199657572
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 229-234) and index.
Summary:Human beings are not model epistemic citizens. Our reasoning can be careless and uncritical, and our beliefs, desires, and other attitudes aren't always as they ought rationally to be. Our beliefs can be eccentric, our desires irrational and our hopes hopelessly unrealistic. Our attitudes are influenced by a wide range of non-epistemic or non-rational factors, including our character, our emotions and powerful unconscious biases. Yet we are rarely conscious of such influences. Self-ignorance is not something to which human beings are immune. In this book Quassim Cassam develops an account of self-knowledge which tries to do justice to these and other respects in which humans aren't model epistemic citizens. He rejects rationalist and other mainstream philosophical accounts of self-knowledge on the grounds that, in more than one sense, they aren't accounts of self-knowledge for humans. Instead he defends the view that inferences from behavioural and psychological evidence are a basic source of human self-knowledge. On this account, self-knowledge is a genuine cognitive achievement and self-ignorance is almost always on the cards. As well as explaining knowledge of our own states of mind, Cassam also accounts for what he calls 'substantial' self-knowledge, including knowledge of our values, emotions, and character. He criticizes philosophical accounts of self-knowledge for neglecting substantial self-knowledge, and concludes with a discussion of the value of self-knowledge. This book tries to do for philosophy what behavioural economics tries to do for economics. Just as behavioural economics is the economics of homo sapiens, as distinct from the economics of an ideally rational and self homo economics, so Cassam argues that philosophy should focus on the human predicament rather on the reasoning and self-knowledge of an idealized homo philosophicus.
Review by Choice Review

Are humans as reasonable and transparent to themselves as philosophers usually expect? Cassam (Univ. of Warwick, UK) has his doubts. People may not always be conscious of what they are thinking, and they only occasionally think about what they are conscious of. Self-knowledge is achievable and valuable but not for the reasons that much of mainstream philosophy has given. Against the tide of reports that humans are irrationally hasty in their judgments, Cassam lowers the bar for rationality to a sensible level and explains the natural cognitive limits and strengths of humans. Against the philosophical tradition favoring an individual's immediate knowledge of inner experiences, Cassam argues that self-reflective attention to awareness involves selection and interpretation. His inferential theory of beliefs about states of mind, feelings, emotions, and values shows how self-knowledge arises from evidence without answering to rationalistic standards. The author also opens up intriguing views about the breadth of human self-ignorance and the relevance of self-knowledge for authenticity and character. Cassam draws on many psychological researchers throughout, among them Daniel Kahneman. Valuable for those interested in epistemology, philosophy of mind, and philosophical psychology. Summing Up: Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty and professionals. --John R. Shook, University of Buffalo

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review