On action /

Ginet ably tackles the major issues in the philosophy of action: the nature of (personal) action, voluntary action, and intentional action; act-individuation; the explanation of action; and freedom of action. Central to the book is a detailed, novel account of volitions and of their place in a theory of action and action-explanation. Work in the philosophy of action tends to be technical and demanding of readers; On Action is no exception. However, its broad scope in conjunction with the economy of Ginet's writing and the skill with which he defends his own position against the leading competing views makes this book an essential addition to any library's collection in the philosophy of action. In scope and style, the book is comparable to Alvin Goldman's A Theory of Human Action (1970), although Ginet and Goldman are on opposite sides of the fence on most of the major issues. Highly recommended to philosophers of action and their advanced undergraduate and graduate students. A. R. Mele Davidson College