A European legal framework for nuclear liability : rethinking current approaches /

A European legal framework for nuclear liability : rethinking current approaches /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Heldt, Tobias.
Imprint:Cambridge : Intersentia ; [Maastricht] : Metro, ©2015.
Description:xv, 249 pages ; 24 cm.
Language:English
Series:Ius commune europaeum ; 143
Ius commune europaeum ; 143.
Subject:
Liability for nuclear damages -- Law and legislation -- European Union countries.
Liability for nuclear damages.
Nuclear energy -- Law and legislation.
Europe -- European Union countries.
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/10463429
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9781780683553
1780683553
Notes:Dissertation.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 215-242).
Standard no.:9781780683553
Table of Contents:
  • Acknowledgments
  • List of Figures and Tables
  • Abbreviations
  • General Introduction
  • Background
  • Research questions
  • Structure and brief overview
  • Part I. The Regulation of Ultra-Hazardous Activities
  • Chapter 1. The Regulation of Ultra-hazardous Activities - The Theoretical Framework
  • 1.1. Setting the scene
  • 1.2. Liability rules and regulation - Mutually exclusive or complementary?
  • 1.2.1. Features of liability rules
  • 1.2.1.1. Negligence
  • 1.2.1.2. Strict liability
  • 1.2.2. Features of regulation
  • 1.2.2.1. Prescriptive regulation
  • 1.2.2.2. Self-regulation
  • 1.2.2.3. Hybrid forms of regulation
  • 1.3. The role of safety standards
  • 1.3.1. The legitimacy of standard-setting bodies
  • 1.3.2. Involving the public - Towards a participatory democracy
  • 1.3.2.1. How much participation?
  • 1.3.2.2. Theoretical justifications
  • 1.3.2.3. Barriers to public participation
  • 1.3.2.4. Designing effective tools for public participation
  • 1.3.3. Transparency, public participation and access to justice in environmental law - Theoretical considerations and available tools
  • 1.3.3.1. The Espoo Convention
  • 1.3.3.2. The Aarhus Convention
  • 1.3.3.2.1. The first two pillars - Access to information and public participation
  • 1.3.3.2.2. The third pillar - Access to justice in environmental matters
  • 1.3.3.3. Environmental Impact Assessments
  • 1.3.4. Transparency, public participation and access to justice in environmental law - Some relevant case law
  • 1.3.5. Transparency, public participation and access to justice in the nuclear sector
  • 1.3.5.1. An Taisce and Hinkley Point C
  • 1.3.5.1.1. Decision of High Court London
  • 1.3.5.1.2. Role of Espoo Implementation Committee
  • 1.3.5.1.3. Decision Court of Appeal London
  • 1.3.5.2. Borssele Nuclear Power Plant
  • 1.3.5.3. Analysis
  • 1.4. Summary
  • Chapter 2. The Regulation of Ultra-hazardous Activities - Experiences from High Risk Sectors
  • 2.1. Risk Regulation in the EU
  • 2.2. The Chemical Sector
  • 2.2.1. The Seveso Directives 4]
  • 2.2.1.1. The Seveso accident
  • 2.2.1.2. Seveso I
  • 2.2.1.3. Seveso II and III
  • 2.2.2. The REACH Regulation
  • 2.2.2.1. European Chemicals Agency
  • 2.2.2.2. Registration
  • 2.2.2.3. Evaluation
  • 2.2.2.4. Authorisation and restriction
  • 2.3. The oil sector
  • 2.3.1. International Conventions
  • 2.3.2. European regime
  • 2.3.2.1. Maritime safety
  • 2.3.2.2. Liability and compensation
  • 2.4. The nuclear sector
  • 2.4.1. Euratom Treaty
  • 2.4.2. Convention on Nuclear Safety
  • 2.4.3. Case 29/99
  • 2.4.4. The Nuclear Safety Directive(s)
  • 2.4.4.1. The 2009 Safety Directive
  • 2.4.4.2. The proposal for a revised Safety Directive
  • 2.4.4.3. The 2014 amendment
  • 2.4.5. Liability and compensation
  • 2.5. Comparative analysis
  • 2.5.1. Regulation at stake
  • 2.5.2. Compensation limits and financial coverage
  • 2.5.3. Public choice considerations
  • Part II. The Regulation of Nuclear Accidents - The European Dimension
  • Chapter 3. The Current Situation within the European Union
  • 3.1. Overview of the international Conventions
  • 3.1.1. One Union, two main systems
  • 3.1.2. Joint Protocol
  • 3.1.3. Convention on Supplementary Compensation
  • 3.1.4. Resulting liability regimes
  • 3.2. Core principles of the international conventions
  • 3.2.1. Strict liability of the nuclear operator
  • 3.2.2. Legal channelling
  • 3.2.3. Amounts and limitation of liability
  • 3.2.4. Compulsory insurance and the principle of congruence
  • 3.3. The European dimension - A comparative overview
  • 3.3.1. Austria
  • 3.3.2. Germany
  • 3.3.3. France
  • 3.3.4. United Kingdom
  • 3.3.5. Comparative summary of the status of the core principles of the international conventions in the national regimes
  • 3.3.5.1. Types of damage covered
  • 3.3.5.2. Limitations of liability and amounts
  • 3.3.5.3. Channelling
  • 3.4. General principles of EU environmental law and nuclear liability
  • 3.4.1. The Precautionary Principle
  • 3.4.1.1. The Precautionary Principle stricto sensu
  • 3.4.1.2. A precautionary approach
  • 3.4.1.3. The Precautionary Principle and its role on decision-making.
  • 3.4.2. The Polluter Pays Principle
  • 3.4.2.1. The Polluter Pays Principle and Euratom
  • 3.4.2.2. Application and consequences of the Polluter Pays Principle
  • 3.5. The need for a new system
  • Chapter 4. Re-examining the Competences of the European Union
  • 4.1. Euratom Treaty versus TFEU
  • 4.1.1. Lex specialis derogat lex generalis
  • 4.1.2. Environmental protection
  • 4.1.2.1. Environmental law and nuclear law - Allies or enemies?
  • 4.1.2.2. Environmental protection under the Euratom Treaty
  • 4.1.3. The role of the European Parliament
  • 4.2. A legal basis for a European nuclear liability regime
  • 4.2.1. Criteria for an appropriate legal basis
  • 4.2.2. The principles of conferral of competences and subsidiarity
  • 4.2.3. Euratom
  • 4.2.3.1. Article 98 - A dormant source of legislative power?
  • 4.2.3.2. Article 203
  • 4.2.4. TFEU
  • 4.2.4.1. Article 194 on Energy
  • 4.2.4.2. Article 192 on the Environment
  • 4.2.4.3. Article 114 on the Internal Market
  • 4.2.4.4. The Titanium Dioxide case law
  • 4.2.5. A dual legal basis
  • 4.3. A European nuclear liability regime - Aligning nuclear energy and environmental protection
  • 4.3.1. Personal injury versus environmental damage
  • 4.3.2. Advantages of a more comprehensive regime
  • Chapter 5. Harmonisation at the European Level - A Desirable Option?
  • 5.1. The economics of Federalism
  • 5.2. The call for harmonisation
  • 5.2.1. Race to the bottom
  • 5.2.2. Economies of scale
  • 5.2.3. Transboundary externalities
  • 5.2.4. Public choice considerations
  • 5.3. Alternatives to harmonisation
  • 5.3.1. Extra-territorial application of national law
  • 5.3.2. The role of mutual recognition
  • 5.4. Analysis
  • 5.4.1. Nuclear Safety Regulation
  • 5.4.2. Nuclear liability
  • 5.4.3. Conclusion
  • 5.4.4. Path dependence
  • Part III. The Way Forward
  • Chapter 6. Nuclear Liability in the European Union - Rethinking Current Principles
  • 6.1. The need for a European system
  • 6.2. Strict liability and beyond - Ensuring deterrence
  • 6.2.1. Strict liability versus negligence
  • 6.2.2. Criminal law
  • 6.3. Legal channelling - Necessity or obstruction?
  • 6.3.1. Reasons and justifications for legal channelling
  • 6.3.2. Disadvantages of legal channelling and alternatives
  • 6.4. Liability amounts
  • 6.4.1. Current nuclear liability amounts
  • 6.4.2. Limitation of liability
  • 6.4.3. Unlimited liability
  • 6.5. Different ways of financing
  • 6.5.1. Insurance and re-insurance markets
  • 6.5.2. Public funding
  • 6.5.3. Operator pooling
  • 6.5.3.1. European wide pooling - Preliminary observations
  • 6.5.3.2. Coverage and available amounts
  • 6.5.3.3. Mutual monitoring and risk diversification
  • 6.5.4. Concluding remarks
  • 6.6. Competition law
  • 6.6.1. Applicability of European competition rules to the nuclear sector
  • 6.6.2. State aid
  • 6.6.3. Nuclear pools and article 101 TFEU
  • 6.7. Proposal for a European regime
  • Chapter 7. The Future of the Nuclear Sector in the European Union
  • 7.1. Challenges on the way towards a European liability system for nuclear accidents
  • 7.2. A European initiative in the area of nuclear liability - Chances and challenges in the light of existing international obligations
  • 7.2.1. Degree of harmonisation at the international level
  • 7.2.2. The relation between international law and European law
  • 7.2.3. Compatibility of the proposal with the international nuclear liability conventions
  • 7.2.3.1. Strict liability of the operator
  • 7.2.3.2. Liability limits
  • 7.2.3.3. The role of legal channelling
  • 7.2.3.4. Summary
  • 7.2.4. A European nuclear liability system and existing obligations towards non-Member States of the European Union
  • 7.3. From proposal to implementation
  • 7.3.1. Improving multi-level governance
  • 7.3.1.1. Member States
  • 7.3.1.2. European institutions
  • 7.3.1.3. Civil society
  • 7.3.1.3.1. Legitimacy concerns
  • 7.3.1.3.2. Inclusiveness of regulation
  • 7.3.2. The role of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR)
  • 7.3.2.1. CSR and public choice
  • 7.3.2.2. CSR and corporate interests
  • 7.3.3. Getting the nuclear industry on board - The Porter Hypothesis
  • 7.3.2.1. Foundations of the Porter Hypothesis
  • 7.3.2.2. Reception of the Porter Hypothesis
  • 7.3.2.3. Three versions of the Porter Hypothesis
  • 7.3.2.4. Relevance of the Porter Hypothesis in the nuclear sector
  • 7.3.2.4.1. Nuclear safety
  • 7.3.2.4.2. Nuclear liability
  • 7.3.4. An independent European Nuclear Agency
  • 7.3.4.1. Potential and limits of European agencies
  • 7.3.4.2. A European Nuclear Agency and multi-level governance
  • Conclusion
  • Policy Documents, Guidelines, Reports
  • Legislation
  • Bibliography
  • Valorisation Addendum
  • Curriculum Vitae

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