Luck's mischief : obligation and blameworthiness on a thread /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Haji, Ishtiyaque, author.
Imprint:New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2016]
Description:xii, 358 pages ; 22 cm
Language:English
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/10465084
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9780190260774
0190260777
9780190260781
9780190260798
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of Contents:
  • Acknowledgments
  • 1. Luck's Hijacking of Obligation and Responsibility
  • 1.1. Luck's Treat to Obligation and Responsibility
  • 1.2. Synopsis
  • 2. Obligation and Alternative Possibilities
  • 2.1. Luck
  • 2.2. Obligation and Alternatives
  • 2.3. Stage-Setting for Objections: Frankfurt Examples
  • 3. Obligation Presupposes Alternatives: A Defense
  • 3.1. Nelkin on a Novel Interpretation of OIC
  • 3.2. An Argument from Frankfurt Examples
  • 3.2.1. Frankfurt Examples and Kant's Law
  • 3.2.2. Frankfurt Examples and Action
  • 3.2.3. Frankfurt Examples and Specific versus General Abilities
  • 3.2.4. Does Blameworthiness Require Impermissibility?
  • 3.3. Truth and the Function of "Ought" Judgments
  • 3.3.1. The Argument from Limitation
  • 3.4. Graham on/Cants Law
  • 3.5. Pereboom's Objections
  • 4. Obligation Under Threat
  • 4.1. Frankfurt Examples, Luck, and Obligation
  • 4.2. Principle Motivation/Ability
  • 4.3. Diminished Obligation
  • 4.4. Objections and Replies
  • 4.5. Another Frankfurt Example
  • 4.6. Obligation and Self-Control
  • 5. Blameworthiness Under Threat
  • 5.1. Blameworthiness and Impermissibility
  • 5.1.1. The Objective View
  • 5.1.2. The Simple Subjective View
  • 5.1.3. The Complex Subjective View
  • 5.2. Respecting Subjective Views
  • 5.2.1. Subjective Views Defended
  • 5.2.2. Subjective Views and the Principle of Alternative Expectations
  • 5.3. Diminished Blameworthiness
  • 5.4. Changing Obligations, Blameworthiness, and Impermissibility
  • 5.5. A Costly Way Out: Obligation and Blameworthiness Rescued
  • 5.6. Semicompatibilism and Nonmoral Varieties of Blameworthiness
  • 5.6.1. Semicompatibilism
  • 5.6.2. Semicompatibilism's Domain
  • 5.6.3. The Scope of Nonmoral Varieties of Blameworthiness
  • 5.7. Teleological Theories, Obligation, and Blameworthiness
  • 6. Ramifications
  • 6.1. Character, Obligation, and Blameworthiness
  • 6.2. On the Moral Aims of Education
  • 6.3. Imperiled Aims
  • 6.3.1. The Defeat of Uprightness
  • 6.3.2. The Defeat of Appraisability
  • 6.3.3. Spreading the Net: More Is at Stake
  • 7. Some Thoughts on the Metaphysics of Free Will
  • 7.1. Constrained Skepticism
  • 7.2. Frankfurt Examples and Guidance Control
  • 7.3. From the Frying Pan into the Fire: Frankfurt Examples Yet Again
  • 7.4. The Traditional Dilemma
  • 7.4.1. Determinism, Obligation, and Blameworthiness
  • 7.4.2. Indeterminism, Obligation, and Blameworthiness
  • 7.4.2.1. Modest Libertarianism and the Luck Objection
  • 7.4.2.2. The No Explanation Version
  • 7.4.2.3. The Pure Luck Version
  • 7.4.2.4. Griffith on the Luck Objection
  • 7.4.2.5. Steward on the Luck Objection
  • 7.4.2.6. Luck and Obligation
  • 7.4.2.7. Determinism and Strong Alternatives
  • 7.4.3. A Slight Digression: Compatibilism and Luck
  • 7.5. Our Morally Messy World
  • Bibliography
  • Index