Two-sided matching : a study in game-theoretic modeling and analysis /
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| Author / Creator: | Roth, Alvin E., 1951- |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | Cambridge ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 1990. |
| Description: | xiii, 265 p. ; 24 cm. |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Econometric Society monographs no. 18 |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | Print Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/1063518 |
Table of Contents:
- Foreword Robert Auman
- Acknowledgment
- 1. Introduction
- Part I. One-To-One Matching: the Marriage Model
- 2. Stable matchings
- 3. The structure of the set of stable matchings
- 4. Strategic questions
- Part II. Many-To-One Matching: Models in which Firms May Employ Many Workers
- 5. The college admissions model and the labor market for medical interns
- 6. Discrete models with money, and more complex preferences
- Part III. Models of One-To-One Matching with Money as a Continuous Variable
- 7. A simple model of one seller and many buyers
- 8. The assignment game
- 9. The generalization of the assignment model
- Part IV. Epilogue
- 10. Open questions and research directions
- Bibliography
- Indexes