| Summary: | Since the end of 20th century, judicial expansion has been observed around the globe to such an extent that the judicialization of politics is now commonplace not only in established democracies, but also in nascent ones. Conventional wisdom has long held that political fragmentation is one critical factor that contributes to this trend. Yet it is by no means the only one, since the development of the judicialization of politics varies across different countries in which the political environments are equally unstable. This dissertation endeavors to fill this academic lacuna by comparing six new democracies in Latin America (Bolivia, Brazil, and Mexico) and Asia (Indonesia, Korea, and Taiwan), applying the most similar cases approach. These cases demonstrate the core element of judicialization of politics: the instrumentality of the judiciary. The judiciary will neither be empowered nor be entrusted with policy-making powers if it is of no use to politicians and citizens. Nonetheless, this still begs the question of why there are different levels of judicialization of politics in variant countries. Here, institutional design in each country directly influences the degree of judicialization of politics. After synthesizing the institutional elements and instrumental factors, my dissertation suggests the following tentative conclusions: 1). political environment matters; 2). a new constitution matters; 3). civil society (judicial popularity) matters. When the political environment is more unstable, when a country enacts a new constitution after democratization, and when civil society is more vibrant, the judicialization of politics will be more comprehensive and intensive.
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