Above politics : bureaucratic discretion and credible commitment /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Miller, Gary J., author.
Imprint:New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, 2016.
Description:xii, 271 pages ; 23 cm.
Language:English
Series:Political economy of institutions and decisions
Political economy of institutions and decisions.
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/10804239
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Whitford, Andrew B., author.
ISBN:9781107008755
1107008751
9781107401310
1107401313
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Summary:"Economic development requires secure contract enforcement and stable property rights. Normal majority-rule politics, such as bargaining over distributive and monetary policies, generate instability and frequently undermine economic development. Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy. Even more compelling is professionalism, which embeds its professional practitioners in professional norms and culture, and incidentally mitigates corruption. Financial examples are provided throughout the book, which ends with an analysis of the role played by professionalized bureaucracies during the Great Recession"--
"Above Politics argues that bureaucracies can contribute to stability and economic development, but only if they are insulated from unstable politics. A separation-of-powers stalemate creates the conditions for bureaucratic autonomy. But what keeps delegated bureaucrats from being more abusive as they become more autonomous? One answer is the negotiation of long-term, cooperative relationships - that (when successful) typically bind subordinates to provide more effort in exchange for autonomy"--
Review by Choice Review

In this work, Miller (Washington Univ., St. Louis) and Whitford (Univ. of Georgia) make a concentrated defense of the role bureaucracy plays in modern American society while warning about the potential dangers posed by legislators and legislative bodies that attempt to remain too involved in the work of public administrators. This theory-based, theory-driven work masterfully weaves analyses and examples that help demonstrate myriad ways bureaucracies can provide stability to government while enhancing economic development--as long as they are permitted to operate as they need to--while politicians (and the public) regularly question whether bureaucrats are neutral while gaining autonomy. In response, Miller and Whitford point to cooperative relationships and professionalism as keys to understanding the incentives of working public administrators. Only through agency independence and professionalized administrations can citizens expect the organizations that execute the activities of daily government to successfully continue balancing public accountability and autonomy. Summing Up: Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates through professionals. --Will Miller, Flagler College

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review