Paradigms of international human rights law /

Paradigms of international human rights law /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Fellmeth, Aaron Xavier, author.
Imprint:New York, NY : Oxford University Press, ©2016.
Description:xiv, 292 pages ; 25 cm
Language:English
Subject:
Human rights.
International law.
Human rights.
International law.
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/10828894
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9780190611279
0190611278
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Table of Contents:
  • Acknowledgments
  • Table of Abbreviations & Citations
  • Introduction
  • Part 1. Human Rights and Fundamental Duties
  • 1. The Concept of Fundamental Duties
  • A. The Universal Duties Movement
  • 1. Individual Duties
  • a. Individual Duties in the International Bill of Rights and Other Human Rights Instruments
  • b. Individual Duties in Human Rights-Related Declarations
  • c. The IAC and UNESCO Declarations of Human Responsibilities
  • d. General Practice of States
  • e. Individual Duties in International Criminal Law
  • f. Why Nonbinding Duties?
  • 2. Corporate Duties
  • B. Five Classes of Beneficiaries of Moral Duties: A Typology
  • 1. Duties toward Other Individuals
  • a. Universal Duties
  • b. Relational Duties
  • 2. Duties toward Groups
  • 3. Duties toward Humankind as a Whole
  • 4. Duties toward Oneself
  • 5. Ecological Duties
  • a. Duties Directly toward Nonhuman Animals
  • b. Duties Directly toward Plants
  • c. Duties Directly toward the Natural Environment
  • d. Duties toward Individuals Relative to a Safe and Healthy Natural Environment
  • C. Conclusion
  • 2. Duties and Rights as Alternative Paradigms
  • A. Universal Human Duties as a Legal Concept
  • 1. Why Individual Duties?
  • 2. Objections to Individual Duties under IHRL
  • a. Individual Duties Would Be Redundant
  • b. Rights Render Individual Duties Unnecessary
  • c. Individual Duties Would Undermine or Weaken Human Rights
  • d. Duties Are Not as Forceful as Rights
  • e. Moral Duties Are Too Indeterminate and Variable to Sustain Legal Implementation
  • f. Most Universal Legal Duties Are Inappropriate Subjects for Public International Law
  • 3. Summary
  • B. Corporate Human Rights Duties as a Legal Concept
  • C. State Fundamental Duties as an Alternative to Individual Human Rights
  • 1. Tonal Connotations of Rights and Duties Paradigms
  • 2. Identification of the Relevant Duty Holder and Extent of Its Duties
  • 3. Ascertainment of Interests of the Right Holder and Right Claiming
  • a. Duties toward Animals
  • b. Duties toward Future Generations
  • c. Ecological Duties
  • Part 2. Nondiscrimination and Substantive Right Claiming Paradigms
  • 3. Nondiscrimination as a Claiming Paradigm
  • A. Two Methods of Value Protection
  • B. The International Legal Definition of Discrimination
  • 1. Similar Situations
  • 2. Legitimate Aim
  • 3. Proportionality
  • C. Contextual Factors in Discrimination Analysis
  • 1. Prohibited Grounds
  • a. The Open Approach
  • b. The Closed List Approach
  • 2. The Protected Interest 140 Nondiscrimination in Identified Rights
  • 3. The Individual and Social Consequences of Discrimination
  • a. Justified Distinctions
  • b. Distinctions to Counter Discrimination: Affirmative Action
  • 4. Source of the Threat
  • 5. Intention to Discriminate
  • D. Rationalizing Nondiscrimination Doctrine
  • 1. Prohibited Grounds
  • 2. The Interests Protected
  • 3. Public and Private Discriminators
  • 4. Intention to Discriminate
  • 4. Interchangeability and Complementarity of Substantive and Nondiscrimination Paradigms
  • A. The Extent and Limits of Equivalence
  • 1. General Substitutability
  • 2. Limits on Substitutability
  • 3. The Ius Cogens Question
  • 4. Group Rights and Discrimination
  • B. Legal Implications and Systemic Consequences of the Choice of Paradigms
  • 1. The Substantive Rights Claiming Paradigm
  • 2. The Discrimination Claiming Paradigm
  • C. Complementarity of Nondiscrimination and Substantive Rights Claims
  • Part 3. Negative and Positive Human Rights
  • 5. Are Negative and Positive Distinct and Meaningful Categories?
  • A. The Conventional Distinction between Negative and Positive Rights
  • 1. Common Definitions
  • 2. The Basis for the Negative and Positive Distinction
  • B. What Makes a Right Negative?
  • C. Can There Be Negative Rights?
  • D. The Concept of "Basic" Positive Rights
  • 1. A Justification for Devoting More Resources to Some Rights than to Others
  • 2. Is Shue's Definition of Basic Rights Overinclusive?
  • 3. Does International Human Rights Law Recognize Some Rights as More "Basic" than Others?
  • 4. Basic Rights and the Duty of Fulfillment
  • 5. The Enforceability of Positive Rights
  • Summary
  • 6. The Legal Consequences of Negative and Positive Paradigms
  • A. The Scope of Negative and Positive Rights
  • 1. Negative and Positive as Non-opposites
  • 2. Nonuniformity in the Strength and Scope of Rights within Categories
  • 3. Pseudo-Positive Rights
  • B. Complementary Framing
  • C. Ambiguously Framed Rights
  • 7. Structural Implications of Negative and Positive Paradigms
  • A. Positive Rights and Economic Development
  • B. Is There a Negative Duty to Renounce Benefits from Injustice?
  • C. Are Positive Rights Generally Desirable?
  • 1. Ethics and Positive Rights
  • 2. Positive Rights as a Practical Concept
  • Epilogue
  • Index

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