The euro and the battle of ideas /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Brunnermeier, Markus Konrad, author.
Imprint:Princeton : Princeton University Press, ©2016.
Description:viii, 440 pages : illustrations ; 25 cm
Language:English
Subject:
Format: Print Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/10988419
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:James, Harold, 1956- author.
Landau, Jean-Pierre, author.
ISBN:9780691172927
0691172927
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages [393]-425) and index.
Summary:"Why is Europe's great monetary endeavor, the Euro, in trouble? A string of economic difficulties in Greece, Ireland, Spain, Italy, and other Eurozone nations has left observers wondering whether the currency union can survive. In this book, Markus Brunnermeier, Harold James, and Jean-Pierre Landau argue that the core problem with the Euro lies in the philosophical differences between the founding countries of the Eurozone, particularly Germany and France. But the authors also show how these seemingly incompatible differences can be reconciled to ensure Europe's survival. As the authors demonstrate, Germany, a federal state with strong regional governments, saw the Maastricht Treaty, the framework for the Euro, as a set of rules. France, on the other hand, with a more centralized system of government, saw the framework as flexible, to be overseen by governments. The authors discuss how the troubles faced by the Euro have led its member states to focus on national, as opposed to collective, responses, a reaction explained by the resurgence of the battle of economic ideas: rules vs. discretion, liability vs. solidarity, solvency vs. liquidity, austerity vs. stimulus. Weaving together economic analysis and historical reflection, The Euro and the Battle of Ideas provides a forensic investigation and a road map for Europe's future." -- Publisher's description
Standard no.:40026608301
Table of Contents:
  • 1. Introduction
  • Part I. Power Shifts and German-French Differences
  • 2. Power Shifts
  • Lethargy of European Institutions
  • The First Power Shift: From Brussels to National Capitals
  • The Second Power Shift: To Berlin-Paris and Ultimately to Berlin
  • After the Power Shift
  • 3. Historical Roots of German-French Differences
  • Cultural Differences
  • Federalism versus Centralism
  • Mittelstand versus National Champions
  • Collaborative versus Confrontational Labor Unions
  • Historical Inflation Experiences
  • 4. German-French Differences in Economic Philosophies
  • Fluid Traditions: Switch to Opposites
  • German Economic Tradition
  • French Economic Tradition
  • International Economics
  • Part II. Monetary and Fiscal Stability: The Ghost of Maastricht
  • 5. Rules, Flexibility, Credibility, and Commitment
  • Time-Inconsistency: Ex Ante versus Ex Post
  • External Commitments: Currency Pegs, Unions, and the Gold Standard
  • Internal Commitments: Reputation and Institutional Design
  • Managing Current versus Avoiding Future Crisis
  • 6. Liability versus Solidarity: No-Bailout Clause and Fiscal Union
  • The No-Bailout Clause
  • Fiscal Unions
  • Eurobonds
  • Policy Recommendations
  • 7. Solvency versus Liquidity
  • Buildup of Imbalances and the Naked Swimmer
  • Solvency
  • Liquidity
  • Crossing the Rubicon via Default
  • Sovereign-Debt Restructuring and Insolvency Mechanism
  • Fiscal Push: Increasing Scale and Scope of EFSF and ESM
  • Monetary Push
  • Policy Recommendations
  • 8. Austerity versus Stimulus
  • The Fiscal Multiplier Debate
  • The Output Gap versus Unsustainable Booms Debate
  • Politics Connects Structural Reforms and Austerity
  • The European Policy Debate on Austerity versus Stimulus
  • Lessons and Policy Recommendations
  • Part III. Financial Stability: Maastricht's Stepchild
  • 9. The Role of the Financial Sector
  • Traditional Banking
  • Modern Banking and Capital Markets
  • Cross-Border Capital Flows and the Interbank Market
  • 10. Financial Crises: Mechanisms and Management
  • Financial Crisis Mechanisms
  • Crisis Management: Monetary Policy
  • Crisis Management: Fiscal Policy and Regulatory Measures
  • Ex Ante Policy: Preventing a Crisis
  • 11. Banking Union, European Safe Bonds, and Exit Risk
  • Banking in a Currency Union
  • Safe Assets: Flight-to-Safety Cross-Border Capital Flows
  • Redenomination and Exit Risks
  • Policy Recommendations
  • Part IV. Others' Perspectives
  • 12. Italy
  • Battling Economic Philosophies within Italy
  • Mezzogiorno: Convergence or Divergence within a Transfer Union
  • Italy's Economic Challenges
  • Politics and Decline
  • 13. Anglo-American Economics and Global Perspectives
  • Diverging Traditions
  • The United States: The Politics of Looking for Recovery
  • The United Kingdom: Brexit and the Politics of Thinking Outside Europe
  • China and Russia
  • Conclusion
  • 14. The International Monetary Fund (IMF)
  • The IMF's Philosophy and Crisis Management
  • The IMF's Initial Involvement in the Euro Crisis
  • The IMF and the Troika
  • A Change in the IMF's Leadership
  • Toss of Credibility: Muddling Through, Delayed Greek PSI
  • 15. European Central Bank (ECB)
  • The ECB before the Crisis: Institutional Design and Philosophy
  • The ECB's Early Successes and Defeats
  • The ECB and Conditionality
  • Lending and Asset Purchase Programs
  • Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) for European Banks
  • Taking Stock: Where Does the ECB Stand?
  • 16. Conclusion: Black and White or Twenty-Eight Shades of Cray?
  • Acknowledgments
  • Notes
  • Index