The empirical foundation of normative arguments in legal reasoning /

The empirical foundation of normative arguments in legal reasoning /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Zhang, Yongjian, 1978- author.
Imprint:[Chicago, Illinois] : Law School, University of Chicago, [2016].
Description:1 online resource (26 pages)
Language:English
Series:Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics working paper ; no. 745
Public law and legal theory working paper ; no. 561
Coase-Sandor Institute for Law and Economics working paper ; no. 745.
Public law and legal theory working paper ; no. 561.
Subject:
Law -- Methodology.
Empiricism.
Empiricism.
Law -- Methodology.
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11005379
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Wang, Peng-Hsiang, author.
Notes:Includes bibliographical references.
Title from online title page (viewed March 28, 2017).
Summary:"While empirical legal studies thrive in the U.S., this is not necessarily the case elsewhere. Yet even in the U.S., the way in which empirical work is useful for normative legal arguments remains unclear. This article first points out the junction between empirical facts and normative arguments. Both teleological and consequentialist arguments, in one of the premises, require "difference-making facts" which point out causal relations. Much empirical research makes causal inferences and thus constitutes an essential part in teleological and consequentialist arguments, which are typical normative arguments in legal reasoning. This article then offers a descriptive theory of legal reasoning. Although some empirical research does not make causal inferences, it still falls within the domain of legal scholarship. This is because describing valid laws is a core function of doctrinal studies of law, and sometimes only sophisticated empirical research can aptly describe laws."

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