The new drug reimbursement game : a regulator's guide to playing and winning /
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| Author / Creator: | Pekarsky, Brita, author. |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | Switzerland : Adis, [2014] ©2015 |
| Description: | 1 online resource : illustrations |
| Language: | English |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | E-Resource Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11088543 |
Table of Contents:
- Foreword; Acknowledgements; Abbreviations; Contents; Chapter 1: Introduction; 1.1 The Regulator℗þs Challenge; 1.2 Is It Plausible That the Threat Exists and That it Influences the Price of New Drugs?; 1.2.1 What Is a Threat?; 1.2.2 A Public Domain Expression of This Threat: The Australian-US FTA; 1.2.3 The Threat Exists and It Is Plausible That It Influences Decisions; 1.3 What Is the Evidence Upon Which This Threat Is Founded?; 1.4 What Are the Current Options for the Decision Threshold?; 1.4.1 Existing Options for the Decision Threshold.
- 1.4.2 The Health Shadow Price as the Decision Threshold1.5 The Framework for This Research; 1.5.1 Price-Effectiveness Analysis; 1.5.2 The Role of the Narrative in the Models and the Research; 1.6 Overview of Book: Concepts, Tools, Rules of the Game; 1.7 Outline of Book; 1.8 Playing and Winning the New Drug Reimbursement Game; References; Part I: The Political Economy of New Drugs and the Value of Pharmaceutical Innovation; Chapter 2: Reframing the Political Economy of New Drugs; 2.1 The Political Economy of New Drugs.
- 2.2 The Rate of Return on Investment in Pharmaceutical RandD and the Political Economy2.3 Is the Political Economy of New Drugs Constant?; 2.4 Reframing the Political Economy; 2.4.1 Architecture of Evidence Based Policy; 2.4.2 Prevailing Political Economy; 2.4.3 An Alternative Political Economy of New Drugs; 2.4.4 Comparison of Prevailing and Proposed Frames; 2.5 Conclusion; References; Chapter 3: The Social Rate of Return on Investment in Pharmaceutical Research and Development; 3.1 The Reimburser℗þs Problem; 3.2 A Closer Look at the Evidence Supporting Pharma℗þs Lobbying.
- 3.2.1 Why Is Return on Consumers℗þ Investment in Pharmaceutical RandD Important?3.2.2 What Is the Evidence of the Return on Consumers℗þ Investment?; 3.2.2.1 A Review of the Literature; 3.2.2.2 The Two Published Estimates of the Social Return to Consumers℗þ Investment in High Prices; 3.3 Fixed, Constrained and Unconstrained Budgets; 3.3.1 Four Types of Budgets; 3.3.2 Why Is It Useful to Have Four Classifications of Budgets?; 3.4 Accommodating the Budget Constraint in the Return on RandD; 3.4.1 A General Expression for the Rate of Return on Consumer Investment in Pharmaceutical RandD.
- 3.4.1.1 The Denominator Captures the Full Financial Value Investment3.4.1.2 The Financial Cost of Investment Is Translated into a Health Loss; 3.4.1.3 The Financial Cost to the Health Budget of Purchasing the New Drugs Is Included; 3.4.1.4 The Financial Costs of the New Drugs Are Converted to Health Effects; 3.5 Conditions Under Which More Future NMEs Means Less Future Health; 3.6 The Conventional Rate of Return and the Constrained Budget; 3.6.1 The Conditions Under Which Fewer Future NMEs and More Future Health Is Possible.