Meaning and mental representation /
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| Author / Creator: | Cummins, Robert, 1944- |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, 1991, ©1989. |
| Description: | 1 online resource (viii, 180 pages) : illustrations |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Bradford book. |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | E-Resource Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11099115 |
Table of Contents:
- Acknowledgments
- Identifying the Problem and Other Preliminaries
- Two Problems about Representation
- The Problem of Representations
- Mind-stuff inFORMed
- Images
- Symbols
- (Actual) neurophysiological states
- The Problem of Representation
- Similarity
- Covariance
- Adaptational role
- Functional or computational role
- Meanings and Meaningfulness
- "Content"
- Methodology
- Representation and Intentionality
- Inexplicit Content
- Content implicit in the state of control
- Content implicit in the domain
- Content implicit in the form of representation
- Content implicit in the medium of representation
- Representation and the Language of Thought
- Cognition and the Mental
- Mental Representation and Meaning
- Original Meaning
- Neo-Gricean Theories
- Intended-Use Theories without Intentionality
- Symmetrical Theories of Meaning
- Grounding Intentionality in Mental Representation
- "Localism"
- "Globalism"
- Conclusion
- Similarity
- Some Whiggish History
- Similarity Critiqued
- The Problem of the Brain as Medium
- The Problem of
- Abstraction
- Covariance I: Locke
- Plot
- Locke on the Semantics of Mental Representation
- Resemblance avoided
- Abstraction achieved
- Misrepresentation
- Malfunctions and Misrepresentations
- Ideal Circumstances for Perception
- Semantic Reductionism
- Inexplicit Content: An Alternative Reply
- Covariation and Inexplicit Content
- Idealization and Infallibility
- Summary
- Covariance II: Fodor
- Background
- The Disjunction Problem
- Idealization
- Objections to Asymmetrical Dependence
- Omniscience
- Idealization Again
- Covariance III: Dretske
- The Account in Knowledge and the Flow of Information
- Misrepresentation
- Functional Meaning
- Evaluating Mf
- Fixing Functions
- Adaptational Role
- Exposition
- Basic Factors
- Evaluation
- Duplicates
- History and Belief
- Conclusion
- The Evidential Value of Adaptational Role
- Interpretational Semantics
- Summary and Advertisement
- Explaining Addition
- Computation
- The Role of Representation in This Explanation
- s-Representation
- Interpretation
- Cognition
- The Specification Problem
- Functional Roles
- Functionalism about Mental Meaning
- "Long-Armed" and "Short-Armed" Roles
- Computational and Causal Roles
- Functional Roles and Conceptual Roles
- Conclusion
- Interpretation and the Reality of Content
- Objections Introduced
- Naturalism
- The causal status of content
- Intentionality
- Naturalism
- The Causal Status of the Contents of s-Representation
- Content and Causation
- The Way of Generalization
- The Way of Counterfactuals
- Content Causation and Explanation by Content
- Intentionality
- S-representation and intentionality
- Can the CTC ignore intentionality?
- Adding intentionality to the Tower Bridge
- Final reminder: How not to play the representation game
- Connectionism and s-Representation1
- Connectionism: The Dime Tour
- Interpretation
- Distributed
- The Conservative Connectionist
- Prospects for a Radical Connectionism
- Option A
- Option B
- Creative Salvage
- Option A
- Option B
- Option C
- Notes
- Bibliography
- Name Index
- Subject Index