Modeling rationality, morality, and evolution /
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Imprint: | New York : Oxford University Press, 1998. |
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Description: | 1 online resource (463 pages) : illustrations. |
Language: | English |
Series: | Vancouver studies in cognitive science ; v. 7 Vancouver studies in cognitive science ; v. 7. |
Subject: | |
Format: | E-Resource Book |
URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11107154 |
Table of Contents:
- Acknowledgments
- Contributors
- 1. Introduction
- Rationality
- 2. Rationality and Rules
- 3. Intention and Deliberation
- 4. Following Through with One's Plans: Reply to David Gauthier
- 5. How Breass' Paradox Solves Newcomb's Problem
- 6. Economics of the Prisoner's Dilemma: A Background
- 7. Modeling Rationality: Normative or Descriptive?
- Modeling Social Interaction
- 8. Theorem 1
- 9. The Failure of Success: Intrafamilial Exploitation in the Prisoner's Dilemma
- 10. Transforming Social Dilemmas: Group Identity and Co-Operation
- 11. Beliefs and Co-Operation
- 12. The Neutral Representation of the Social World
- Morality
- 13. David Schmidtz
- 14. Categorically Rational Preferences and the Structure of Morality
- 15. Why We Need a Moral Equilibrium Theory
- 16. Moralty's Last Chance
- Evolution
- 17. Mutual Aid: Darwin Meets The Logic of Decision
- 18. Three Differences between Deliberation and Evolution
- 19. Evolutionary Models of Co-Operative Mechanisms: Artificial Morality and Genetic Programming
- 20. Norms as Emergent Properties of Adaptive Learning: The Case of Economic Routines