Greed, chaos, and governance : using public choice to improve public law /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Mashaw, Jerry L., author.
Imprint:New Haven : Yale University Press, ©1997.
Description:1 online resource (ix, 231 pages) : illustrations
Language:English
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11113494
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:0585361177
9780585361178
9780300147421
0300147422
0300066775
0300078706
9780300066777
Notes:"An elaboration and extension of themes developed in the Rosenthal Lectures at Northwestern University Law School"--Page opp. title page.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 211-227) and index.
Print version record.
Summary:Public choice theory should be taken seriously - but not too seriously. In this thought-provoking book, Jerry Mashaw stakes out a middle ground between those who champion public choice theory (the application of the conventional methodology of economics to political science matters, also known as rational choice theory) and those who disparage it. He argues that in many cases public choice theory's reach has exceeded its grasp. In others, public choice insights have not been pursued far enough by those who are concerned with the operation and improvement of legal institutions.
Other form:Print version: Mashaw, Jerry L. Greed, chaos, and governance. New Haven : Yale University Press, ©1997 0300066775
Description
Summary:Public choice theory should be taken seriously -- but not too seriously. In this thought-provoking book, Jerry Mashaw stakes out a middle ground between those who champion public choice theory (the application of the conventional methodology of economics to political science matters, also known as rational choice theory) and those who disparage it. He argues that in many cases public choice theory's reach has exceeded its grasp. In others, public choice insights have not been pursued far enough by those who are concerned with the operation and improvement of legal institutions.<p>While Mashaw addresses perennial questions of constitutional law, legislative interpretation, administrative law, and the design of public institutions, he arrives at innovative conclusions. Countering the positions of key public choice theorists, Mashaw finds public choice approaches virtually useless as an aid to the interpretation of statutes, and he finds public choice arguments against delegating political decisions to administrators incoherent. But, using the tools of public choice analysts, he reverses the lawyers' conventional wisdom by arguing that substantive rationality review is not only legitimate but a lesser invasion of legislative prerogatives than much judicial interpretation of statutes. And, criticizing three decades of "law reform", Mashaw contends that pre-enforcement judicial review of agency rules has seriously undermined both governmental capacity and the rule of law.
Item Description:"An elaboration and extension of themes developed in the Rosenthal Lectures at Northwestern University Law School"--Page opp. title page.
Physical Description:1 online resource (ix, 231 pages) : illustrations
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references (pages 211-227) and index.
ISBN:0585361177
9780585361178
9780300147421
0300147422
0300066775
0300078706
9780300066777