Greed, chaos, and governance : using public choice to improve public law /

Greed, chaos, and governance : using public choice to improve public law /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Mashaw, Jerry L., author.
Imprint:	New Haven : Yale University Press, ©1997.
Description:	1 online resource (ix, 231 pages) : illustrations
Language:	English
Subject:	Legislation -- United States. Administrative procedure -- United States. Social choice. Administrative procedure. Legislation. Social choice. United States. Electronic books.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11113494

Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:	0585361177 9780585361178 9780300147421 0300147422 0300066775 0300078706 9780300066777
Notes:	"An elaboration and extension of themes developed in the Rosenthal Lectures at Northwestern University Law School"--Page opp. title page. Includes bibliographical references (pages 211-227) and index. Print version record.
Summary:	Public choice theory should be taken seriously - but not too seriously. In this thought-provoking book, Jerry Mashaw stakes out a middle ground between those who champion public choice theory (the application of the conventional methodology of economics to political science matters, also known as rational choice theory) and those who disparage it. He argues that in many cases public choice theory's reach has exceeded its grasp. In others, public choice insights have not been pursued far enough by those who are concerned with the operation and improvement of legal institutions.
Other form:	Print version: Mashaw, Jerry L. Greed, chaos, and governance. New Haven : Yale University Press, ©1997 0300066775

Table of Contents:

The challenge of positive political theory
The quest for usable knowledge
Public choice and rationality review
Legislatures, deals, and statutory interpretation
Explaining administrative process
Should administrators make political decisions?
Legal control of administrative policymaking : the "judicial review game"
Separated powers and regulatory policymaking
Public choice pragmatics.