Hidden Bibliographic Details
| ISBN: | 9780585346885
0585346887
9780300160963
0300160968
9780300060348
0300060343
9780300080698
0300080697
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| Notes: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 223-234) and index.
English.
Print version record.
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| Summary: | Scott Sigmund Gartner develops a theory to explain how military and government leaders evaluate wartime performance, how much they change strategies in response to this evaluation, and why they are frequently at odds when discussing the success or failure of strategic performance. Blending history, decision theory, and mathematical modeling, Gartner argues that military personnel do reevaluate their strategies and that they measure the performance of a strategy through quantitative, "dominant" indicators. Gartner tests his argument with three case studies: the British shift to convoys in World War I following the German imposition of unrestricted submarine warfare; the lack of change in British naval policy in the Battle of the Atlantic following the German introduction of Wolf Packs in World War II; and the American decision to deescalate in Vietnam after the Tet Offensive. He also tests his approach in a non-war situation, analyzing the Carter Administration's decision to launch the hostage rescue attempt.
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| Other form: | Print version: Gartner, Scott Sigmund, 1963- Strategic assessment in war. New Haven, Conn. : Yale University Press, ©1997 9780300060348 9780300080698
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