Springs of action : understanding intentional behavior /

Mele furthers the debate regarding several key issues in the philosophy of action. The first section of the book is devoted to defending and refining the traditional account of intentional action, which holds that intentional actions can be explained causally, and that mental states such as beliefs and desires must play a role in any adequate causal explanation. The second section advances the more controversial claim that intentions cannot be reduced to or identified with these other mental states either singly or in some combination, but instead exist in their own right as additional components of persons' mental lives. In both sections Mele discusses the background issues and alternative theories that serve as foils for his positions, and in the process he offers an excellent review of much of the recent literature in action theory. Philosophers and psychologists who do research in the philosophy of mind will find the book engaging. It is, however, fairly technical, and the debate takes place at a sophisticated level; consequently it will be most profitable for graduate students and faculty members with interests in these areas. M. A. Michael; University of Nevada, Las Vegas