Language, thought and consciousness : an essay in philosophical psychology /

Language, thought and consciousness : an essay in philosophical psychology /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Carruthers, Peter, 1952-
Imprint:Cambridge [England] ; New York, N.Y. : Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Description:1 online resource (xv, 291 pages)
Language:English
Subject:
Psycholinguistics.
Thought and thinking.
Philosophy and cognitive science.
Psycholinguistics.
Thinking.
Consciousness.
Philosophy.
Philosophy and cognitive science.
Psycholinguistics.
Thought and thinking.
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11114476
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:0511002076
9780511002076
9780521639996
0521639999
0521481589
9780521481588
9780511583360
0511583362
0521639999
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 280-286) and index.
English.
Print version record.
Summary:Do we think in natural language? Or is language only for communication? Much recent work in philosophy and cognitive science assumes the latter. In contrast, Peter Carruthers argues that much of human conscious thinking is conducted in the medium of natural language sentences. However, this does not commit him to any sort of Whorfian linguistic relativism, and the view is developed within a framework that is broadly nativist and modularist. His study will be essential reading for all those interested in the nature and significance of natural language, whether they come from philosophy, psychology or linguistics.
Other form:Print version: Carruthers, Peter, 1952- Language, thought and consciousness. Cambridge [England] ; New York, N.Y. : Cambridge University Press, 1996 0521639999
Table of Contents:
  • Preface
  • Introduction
  • 1. The geography of the issues
  • 1.1. Conceptual versus natural modality
  • 1.2. Implications for philosophy and psychology
  • 1.3. Of wolves and wolf-children
  • 1.4. Stalnaker's intelligent Martians
  • 1.5. Anti-realist arguments
  • 1.6. Realism in mind
  • 1.7. Innateness and theory of mind
  • 1.8. Thinking: images or sentences?
  • 2. Which language do we think with?
  • 2.1. The evidence from scientific psychology
  • 2.2. The evidence of introspection: images and imaged sentences
  • 2.3. The scope and strength of the introspective thesis
  • 2.4. Objections and elucidations
  • 2.5. Fallible introspection and Fodor
  • 2.6. Individuating propositional attitudes
  • 2.7. Animals and infants
  • 2.8. Language-learning and sub-personal thought
  • 3. Thought-based semantics
  • 3.1. The argument from foreign believers
  • 3.2. Grice's thought-based semantics
  • 3.3. Two objections
  • 3.4. Searle's version of thought-based semantics
  • 3.5. A marriage of Searle and Fodor?
  • 3.6. Causal co-variance theories
  • 3.7. Misrepresentation, and asymmetric causal dependence
  • 3.8. The all Ss problem
  • 4. Holism and language
  • 4.1. From mental realism to Mentalese
  • 4.2. The demand for scientific vindication
  • 4.3. The problem of holism
  • 4.4. Between holism and atomism
  • 4.5. Arguments for holism
  • 4.6. The need for a language-based semantics
  • 4.7. Language-based semantics 1: functional-role semantics
  • 4.8. Language-based semantics 2: canonical acceptance conditions
  • 5. First steps towards a theory of consciousness
  • 5.1. Retrospect: the need for a theory of consciousness
  • 5.2. Conscious versus non-conscious mental states
  • 5.3. Cartesian consciousness
  • 5.4. Why Cartesianism won't do
  • 5.5. What kind of theory do we want?
  • 5.6. Kirk: presence to central decision-making
  • 5.7. Higher-order discrimination and feel
  • 5.8. The case for higher-order thought theory
  • 6. Second (-order) steps towards a theory of consciousness
  • 6.1. Theory 1: actual and conscious
  • 6.2. Theory 2: actual and non-conscious
  • 6.3. Theory 3: potential and non-conscious
  • 6.4. Theory 4: potential and conscious
  • 6.5. Dennett 1978: availability to print-out
  • 6.6. Dennett 1991: multiple drafts and probes
  • 6.7. Time and indeterminacy
  • 6.8. Dennett on the place of language in thought
  • 7. A reflexive thinking theory of consciousness
  • 7.1. Reflexive thinking theory
  • 7.2. Contrasts and advantages
  • 7.3. Conscious versus non-conscious thinking
  • 7.4. Objections and elucidations
  • 7.5. The problem of unity
  • 7.6. The problem of phenomenal feel
  • 7.7. A Cartesian Theatre?
  • 7.8. Animals and infants revisited
  • 8. The involvement of language in conscious thinking
  • 8.1. An architecture for human thinking
  • 8.2. An evolutionary story
  • 8.3. The argument from introspection revisited
  • 8.4. Working memory and the central executive
  • 8.5. The thesis of natural necessity (weak)
  • 8.6. Objections and elucidations
  • 8.7. The thesis of natural necessity (strong)
  • 8.8. The scope and significance of NN
  • Conclusion
  • References
  • Index

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