Perfect deterrence /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Zagare, Frank C.
Imprint:Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, ©2000.
Description:1 online resource (xxii, 414 pages) : illustrations
Language:English
Series:Cambridge studies in international relations ; 72
Cambridge studies in international relations ; 72.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11115513
Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:Kilgour, D. Marc.
ISBN:0511030843
9780511030840
0511016743
9780511016745
9780511491788
0511491786
0521781744
9780521781749
9780511046094
051104609X
0511151624
9780511151620
9786610429837
6610429839
0521781744
0521787130
9780521781749
9780521787130
1107120446
9781107120440
1280429836
9781280429835
0511172761
9780511172762
0511310773
9780511310775
Digital file characteristics:data file
Notes:Includes bibliographical references.
English.
Print version record.
Summary:An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject.
Other form:Print version: Zagare, Frank C. Perfect deterrence. Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY : Cambridge University Press, ©2000

MARC

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245 1 0 |a Perfect deterrence /  |c Frank C. Zagare and D. Marc Kilgour. 
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505 0 |a Classical deterrence theory -- Rationality and deterrence -- Credibility and deterrence -- Uncertainty and mutual deterrence -- Unilateral deterrence -- Modeling extended deterrence -- Modeling massive retaliation -- Modeling flexible response -- Limited war, crisis escalation, and extended deterrence -- Perfect deterrence theory. 
588 0 |a Print version record. 
520 8 |a An important and timely contribution to International Relations and political science, this is the first general analysis of deterrence since the end of the Cold War. Using non-cooperative game theory, the authors develop a new approach to deterrence (Perfect Deterrence Theory), which they apply to unilateral and mutual direct-deterrence relationships, and to extended-deterrence relationships supported by deployment policies such as Massive Retaliation and Flexible Response. The authors focus on the relationship among capabilities, preferences, credibility, and outcomes to achieve a new understanding of threats and responses. Some surprising conclusions emerge, indicating that credible threats to respond to attack can sometimes make an attack more likely, and that incredible response threats can sometimes promote peace. With the application of deterrence theory in diverse social settings, and historical examples from before, during, and after the Cold War, this book provides a welcome new examination of the subject. 
546 |a English. 
650 0 |a Deterrence (Strategy)  |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85037301 
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650 7 |a Deterrence (Strategy)  |2 fast  |0 (OCoLC)fst00891658 
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655 0 |a Electronic books. 
655 4 |a Electronic books. 
700 1 |a Kilgour, D. Marc. 
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