Perfect deterrence /

Zagare (SUNY-Buffalo) and Kilgour (Wilfried Laurier Univ., Canada) tackle the formidable task of developing a theory of deterrence that is generally applicable and not limited to the Cold War period and its nuclear technology. Drawing from noncooperative game theory, they posit a "Perfect Deterrence Theory," which they hold to be more logically consistent and more empirically plausible than current theoretical expositions on deterrence. In a tightly argued social science prose replete with eight appendixes of mathematical proofs, the authors present their Perfect Deterrence Theory, which in their view offers a valuable and consistent perspective to view the dynamics of social conflict and to prepare successful national strategies to deal with international conflict in a post-Cold War era. This impressive and valuable work belongs in university libraries offering graduate work in international relations and will prove most useful for researchers and practitioners in conflict resolution studies. J. A. Rhodes Luther College