Grant's secret service : the intelligence war from Belmont to Appomattox /

Just when one thinks that all that can be said about General Ulysses S. Grant's Civil War campaigns has been said, this book appears. Feis (Buena Vista Univ.) provides fresh and unique insights into Grant's planning and strategy based on substantial original research focusing on how Grant used (or did not use) intelligence information throughout the war. Early in the conflict, this information was scarce and its quality crude and unsophisticated, forcing Grant to learn how to interpret materials gathered from a wide variety of sources. He made mistakes and usually learned from them. In his Virginia campaigns, Grant played an important role in developing an excellent system for collecting and evaluating intelligence and put the knowledge gained to good use. Feis concludes, "A key element of Grant's success was not his lack of concern for what the enemy did out of his sight, but his ability to prevent that concern--and the paralyzing uncertainty it fostered--from becoming an insurmountable impediment on the road to victory." Anyone interested in the American Civil War will appreciate Feis's splendid book. All levels and collections. D. L. Wilson Southern Illinois University Carbondale

The study of intelligence during the Civil War is beginning to emerge from a melodramatic concern with assassination plots and secret agents. Most operationally focused histories seldom go beyond the level of reconnaissance reports, except to excoriate George McClellan for relying on the spectacularly unreliable reports of Allan Pinkerton. Edwin Fishel's pathbreaking The Secret War for the Union (1996) has until now been the principal and honorable exception. Buena Vista University historian Feis joins him with this magisterial analysis of Ulysses Grant's acquisition and use of military intelligence from his first days in command to the end of the war in Virginia. Grant's Mexican War experience taught him the advantages of combining his own understanding of a situation with learning an enemy's circumstances before undertaking a particular action. Feis makes comprehensive use of archival and published sources to show how Grant tried to "keep himself posted." He grew increasingly sophisticated in using secret service work, newspaper accounts and reconnaissance reports to understand his opponents their characters as well as their intentions. Grant never allowed himself to be paralyzed by either not enough intelligence or too much of it. When gaps in his information emerged, as in the early stages of the Vicksburg campaign, he used the initiative wherever possible to shift the burden of uncertainty to the Confederates. Shiloh in 1862, the Wilderness in 1864 and Jubal Early's raid on Washington the same year were reminders that initiative and intuition were not ideal substitutes for information, a lesson well learned as the war entered its final phase. (Apr. 5) Forecast: As the role of intelligence in war comes further to the fore of popular consciousness, this book can be recommended to readers seeking a historical perspective on military decision making, as its selection for the History Book Club suggests. Academic libraries are a lock. (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved

In this intelligent, informed, and copiously detailed account, Feis (history, Buena Vista Univ.) counters the common view that Ulysses Grant disdained military intelligence and fought on intuition alone by showing that Grant slowly acquired respect for and reliance on intelligence as the complexity and range of war widened and as intelligence gathering improved. Grant cared what the enemy did when he could not see them, but unlike other Union generals, he was not paralyzed by such concerns. He trusted his own judgment, sometimes too much so. Grant's overarching philosophy of war was that the side that held the initiative held the critical advantage. Thus, finding the enemy and then striking him hard and often was Grant's formula for success. Military intelligence allowed him to act and especially guided his strategy in the East in 1864 and 1865, which finally won the war. Feis's book offers the first full-dress study of military intelligence and Grant's command. It also provides an essential primer on the ways intelligence was gathered and assessed during the war. Recommended for major public and academic libraries. Randall M. Miller, Saint Joseph's Univ., Philadelphia (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.