Terrorism, asymmetric warfare, and weapons of mass destruction : defending the U.S. homeland /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Cordesman, Anthony H.
Imprint:Westport, CT : Praeger, 2002.
Description:1 online resource (x, 448 pages)
Language:English
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11117589
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ISBN:0313006903
9780313006906
0275974278
9780275974275
0275974278
9780313361197
0313361193
Digital file characteristics:data file
Notes:"Published in cooperation with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Washington, D.C."
Includes bibliographical references.
Restrictions unspecified
Electronic reproduction. [Place of publication not identified] : HathiTrust Digital Library, 2019.
Master and use copy. Digital master created according to Benchmark for Faithful Digital Reproductions of Monographs and Serials, Version 1. Digital Library Federation, December 2002. http://purl.oclc.org/DLF/benchrepro0212
English.
digitized 2019 HathiTrust Digital Library committed to preserve
Print version record.
Summary:New threats require new thinking. State attacks involving long-range missiles or conventional military forces are not the only threat to the U.S. homeland. Covert attacks by state actors, state use of proxies, independent terrorist and extremist attacks by foreign groups or individuals--and even by residents of the United States--are significant issues for future U.S. security. In this comprehensive work, Cordesman offers a range of recommendations, from reevaluating what constitutes a threat and bolstering homeland defense measures, to improving resource allocation and sharpening intelligence. Annotation. Cordesman (Middle East program, Center for Strategic and International Studies) argues that homeland defense must respond to a constantly changing threat, and especially to the kind that may be impossible to predict, and which may emerge as a pattern of attack in the years to come. He discusses such aspects as assessing risks, prioritizing threats, types of attacks, creating a homeland defense capability, and federal cooperation.
Other form:Print version: Cordesman, Anthony H. Terrorism, asymmetric warfare, and weapons of mass destruction. Westport, CT : Praeger, 2002 0275974278
Table of Contents:
  • Acknowledgments
  • Chapter 1. The Changing Face of Asymmetric Warfare and Terrorism
  • The Growing Focus on Terrorism
  • Terrorism versus Asymmetric Warfare
  • Chapter 2. Risk Assessment: Planning for "Non-patterns" and Potential Risk
  • Looking Beyond Emotional Definitions of Terrorism
  • Rethinking the Mid- and Long-term Risk of Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Attack
  • Patterns and Non-patterns in the Number of Attacks
  • Casualties versus Incidents: The Lack of Correlation
  • U.S. and American Casualties versus International Casualties
  • Considering the Threat from State and Non-state Actors
  • States, "Terrorists," and Acts of War
  • Planning for Major Attacks and Asymmetric Warfare by State Actors
  • The Threat of "Proxies" and "Networks"
  • Dealing with Nuance and Complex Motives
  • Consideration of the Full Spectrum of Possible Types and Methods of Attack: The Need to Consider "Worst Cases"
  • Making Offense, Deterrence, Denial, Defense, and Retaliation Part of Homeland Defense
  • Linking Homeland Defense to Counterproliferation
  • Chapter 3. Threat Prioritization: Seeking to Identify Current and Future Threats
  • Potential State Actors
  • A Department of State Assessment of State Threats
  • A Department of Defense Assessment of Threats from Foreign States
  • The Probable Lack of Well-Defined Strategic Warning of a Threat from State Actors and Unpredictable Behavior in a Crisis
  • Foreign Terrorists and Extremists
  • Continuing Threats and Counterterrorist Action
  • Major Foreign Terrorist Groups and Extremists
  • Threats from Foreign Students and Immigrants
  • Domestic Terrorists and Extremists
  • The Implications of Past Terrorist Attacks
  • Probability versus Probability Theory
  • Chapter 4. Types of Attack: Determining Future Methods of Attack and the Needed Response
  • Illustrative Attack Scenarios
  • "Conventional" Means of Attack
  • Weapons of Mass Destruction
  • Chemical Weapons As Means of Attack
  • The Impact and Variety of Possible Chemical Weapons
  • The probable Lethality and Effectiveness of Chemical Attacks
  • Methods of Delivery
  • Detection and Interception
  • Acquiring Chemical Weapons
  • The Impact of Technological Change
  • The Aum Shinrikyo Case Study
  • Political and Psychological Effects
  • The Problem of Response
  • Biological Weapons As Means of Attack
  • Categorizing the Biological Threat
  • Case Studies: Iraq and Russia
  • State Actor, Proxy, and Terrorist/Extremist Incidents to Date
  • The Yugoslav Smallpox Incident
  • Cases in the United States
  • The Lethality and Effectiveness of Current Biological Weapons
  • Means of Delivery
  • Manufacturing Biological Weapons
  • Changes in Technology and the Difficulty of Manufacture
  • The Growing Lethality of Biological Weapons and Growing Ease of Manufacture
  • New Types of Biological Weapons
  • Changes in Disease: Piggybacking on the Threat from Nature
  • Agricultural and Ecological Attacks
  • The Problem of Response
  • Radiological Weapons As Means of Attack
  • The Practical Chances of Using Radiological Weapons
  • The Practical Risks and Effects of Using Radiological Weapons
  • Nuclear Weapons As Means of Attack
  • Lethality and Effectiveness
  • Is There a Threat from State Actors, Proxies, Terrorists, and Extremists? The Problem of Getting the Weapon
  • The Problem of Delivery
  • Dealing with the Risk and Impact of Nuclear Attacks
  • Chapter 5. Threat Assessment and Prioritization: Identifying Threats
  • Dr. Pangloss versus Chicken Little and the Boy Who Cried Wolf
  • The Problem of Detection, Warning, and Response
  • Living with Complexity and Uncertainty: A Flexible and Evolutionary Approach
  • The "Morning After," Multiple Attacks; The "Morning After" and the "Learning Curve Effect"
  • Chapter 6. U.S. Government Efforts to Create a Homeland Defense Capability
  • Key Presidential Decision Directives and Legislation Affecting the Federal Response
  • Ongoing Changes in the Structure of the Federal Effort
  • The Growth of the Federal Effort
  • The FY2000 Program
  • The FY2001 Program
  • The Details of the Federal Effort
  • The Changing Patterns in Federal Spending
  • Planning and Programming the Overall Federal Effort
  • Antiterrorism, Counterterrorism, and Core Spending
  • Spending on Preparedness for Attacks Using Weapons of Mass Destruction
  • Chapter 7. Federal Efforts by Department and Agency
  • Department of Agriculture
  • National Animal Health Emergency Program
  • Central Intelligence Agency
  • Department of Commerce
  • Department of Defense
  • Analyzing the Role of the DOD
  • The Size of the Current DOD Effort
  • Dedicated FY2001 DOD Expenditures for CBRN/WMD Homeland Defense
  • Key DOD Activities
  • Antiterrorism and Force Protection
  • Counterterrorism
  • Terrorism Consequence Management
  • Specialized DOD Teams and Units for Defense and Response
  • Research and Development
  • Intelligence
  • Counterforce Capability against an Adversary's Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Infrastructures
  • The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program
  • Conclusions
  • Department of Energy
  • Office of Nonproliferation and National Security
  • Office of Emergency Management
  • Office of Defense Programs
  • Office of Emergency Response
  • Nuclear Emergency Search Team
  • Radiological Assistance Program
  • The Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Emergency Operations Program
  • Research and Development
  • Environmental Protection Agency
  • Office of Solid Waste and Emergency Response
  • On-Scene Coordinator
  • Federal Emergency Management Agency
  • Response and Recovery Directorate
  • Preparedness, Training, and Exercises Directorate
  • U.S. Fire Administration
  • National Fire Academy and Emergency Management Institute
  • General Services Administration
  • Department of Health and Human Services
  • Metropolitan Medical Response Systems
  • National Pharmaceutical Stockpile Program
  • Public Health Surveillance System for WMD
  • Research and Development
  • Department of the Interior
  • Department of Justice and Federal Bureau of Investigation
  • National Domestic Preparedness Office
  • Office for State and Local Domestic Preparedness Support
  • National Domestic Preparedness Consortium
  • Awareness of National Security Issues and Response Program
  • National Institute of Justice
  • National Security Community
  • Nuclear Regulatory Commission
  • Department of State
  • Embassy Protection
  • Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism
  • Bureau of Consular Affairs
  • Bureau of Diplomatic Security
  • Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
  • Export Controls and Homeland Defense
  • Arms Control and Homeland Defense
  • Department of Transportation
  • Department of Treasury
  • Department of Veterans Affairs
  • Looking Beyond September 2001
  • Chapter 8. Federal, State, and Local Cooperation
  • Planning for Low- to Mid-Level Terrorism
  • West Nile Outbreak
  • The Lessons from "Jointness"
  • Chapter 9. How Other Nations Deal with These Threats
  • Leadership and Management
  • Policies and Strategies
  • Claimed Reliance on Criminal Prosecution As the Major Response and Deterrent
  • Oversight, Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
  • Resource Allocations Are Targeted at Likely Threats, Not Vulnerabilities: Limited Concern with WMD Threats
  • Learning from Foreign Countries
  • Chapter 10. Lessons from Recent Major Commissions on Terrorism
  • The Gilmore, Bremer, and Hart-Rudman Commissions
  • Areas Where the Commissions Made Similar Recommendations
  • Gilmore and Bremer Commissions: Executive Coordination and Management
  • Gilmore and Bremer Commissions: Congressional Oversight
  • Gilmore and Bremer Commissions: Intelligence Gathering and Sharing
  • Gilmore and Bremer Commissions: Clarify Authority, Command, and Control
  • Bremer and Hart-Rudman Commissions: Biological Pathogens, International Consensus against Terrorism, and Strengthening of Public Health Systems
  • Bremer and Hart-Rudman Commissions: Strengthening the International Consensus against Terrorism and the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism
  • Areas Where the Commissions Made Different Recommendations
  • Gilmore Commission: Threat Assessments
  • Gilmore Commission: National Strategy for Domestic Preparedness and CBRN Terrorism Response
  • Gilmore Commissions: Standardization of Legal Terms
  • Gilmore Commission: National Standards for Equipment
  • Bremer Commission: Treatment of Former and Future States of Concern
  • Bremer Commission: Targeting Terrorist Financial Resources
  • Bremer Commission: Liability Insurance
  • Bremer Commission: Realistic Exercises
  • Chapter 11. Conclusions and Recommendations
  • Correcting the Strategic Gaps in the U.S. Approach to Homeland Defense
  • Focusing Less on Who's in Charge and More on What They Should Be in Charge of
  • Planning for Higher-Probability, Lower-Consequence, and Lower-Probability, Higher-Consequence Events
  • Planning for Terrorism and Asymmetric Warfare
  • Reacting to the Uncertain Nature of the Threat
  • The Lack of "Transparency" in Federal Programs
  • Effective Action Must Be Broad-Based and Suboptimize Efficiently
  • Focusing on Priorities, Programs, and Trade-offs: Creating Effective Planning, Programming, and Budgeting
  • Managing Research and Development, Rather Than Treating Asymmetric Attacks, Terrorism, and the CBRN Threat As an Excuse for a "Wish List" and "Slush Fund"
  • Looking Beyond CBRN Threats: Dealing with All Medical Risks and Costs, the Need for a Comprehensive Public Information Capability, and the Linkage to Improved Strategic Deterrence and Response Capabilities
  • Homeland Defense and/or Law Enforcement
  • The Role of the Intelligence Community and the Need for Improved Intelligence
  • The Challenge of Operations
  • Rule of Law, Human Rights, Asymmetric Warfare, High Levels of Attack, and "New Paradigms"
  • The Need for Central Coordination and Management of the Federal Effort
  • Broader Solutions and New Approaches to National Strategy: Reacting to Asymmetric Warfare