The bounds of agency : an essay in revisionary metaphysics /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Rovane, Carol A. (Carol Anne), 1955-
Imprint:	Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, ©1998.
Description:	1 online resource (viii, 260 pages)
Language:	English
Subject:	Agent (Philosophy) Self (Philosophy) Subject (Philosophy) Agent (Philosophy) Self (Philosophy) Subject (Philosophy) Electronic books.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11118504

Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:	1400813239 9781400813230 0691017166 9780691017167 1282753339 9781282753334
Digital file characteristics:	data file
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references (pages 251-254) and index. Print version record.
Summary:	The subject of personal identity is one of the most central and most contested and exciting in philosophy. Ever since Locke, psychological and bodily criteria have vied with one another in conflicting accounts of personal identity. Carol Rovane argues that, as things stand, the debate is unresolvable since both sides hold coherent positions that our common sense will embrace. Our very common sense, she maintains, is conflicted; so any resolution to the debate is bound to be revisionary. She boldly offers such a revisionary theory of personal identity by first inquiring into the nature of persons. Rovane begins with a premise about the distinctive ethical nature of persons to which all substantive ethical doctrines ranging from Kantian to egoist, can subscribe. From this starting point, she derives two startling metaphysical possibilities: there could be group persons composed of many human beings and multiple persons within a single human being. Her conclusion supports Locke's distinction between persons and human beings, but on altogether new grounds. These grounds lie in her radically normative analysis of the condition of personal identity, as the condition in which a certain normative commitment arises, namely, the commitment to achieve overall rational unity within a rational point of view. It is by virtue of this normative commitment that individual agents can engage one another specifically as persons, and possess the distinctive ethical status of persons. This highly original book departs significantly from the standard philosophical views of personal identity. It will be of major importance in the fields of metaphysics, moral philosophy, and philosophy of mind.
Other form:	Print version: Rovane, Carol A. (Carol Anne), 1955- Bounds of agency. Princeton, N.J. : Princeton University Press, ©1998 0691017166
Standard no.:	ebc668953

Table of Contents:

Acknowledgments
Pt. I. Lessons from Locke Introduction to Part I
Ch. 1. Preview of the Normative Analysis of Personal Identity
1. Locke's Analysis
2. Rational Points of View
3. The Explanatory Goal of the Normative Analysis
4. Meeting the Explanatory Goal
5. A Final Comparison with Locke
Ch. 2. On the Need for Revision
1. What the Lockean Thought Experiments Really Show
2. The Conflict Is Not Merely Apparent
3. Neither Side of the Conflict Is Incoherent
4. Seeking Positive Reasons to Embrace One Side of the Conflict
Ch. 3. A Revisionary Proposal
1. What Are Agency-Regarding Relations?
2. The Ethical Criterion Meets All Three Constraints
Pt. II. Personal Identity: The Body Practic Introduction to Part II
Ch. 4. A Sufficient Condition for Personal Identity
1. The Case for Group Persons
2. Intra- and Interpersonal Relations
3. The Normative Analysis of Personal Identity: A First Full Statement
Ch. 5. The Sufficient Condition Is Also Necessary
1. A Rational Reconstruction of Multiple Personality Disorder
2. Justifying the Commitment to Overall Rational Unity
3. Some Remaining Metaphysical Issues
Ch. 6. The First Person
1. The Distinctive Features of the First Person
2. Self-Oriented Ethical Relations
Postscript
Bibliography
Index

The bounds of agency : an essay in revisionary metaphysics /

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