Theory of public finance in a federal state /
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| Author / Creator: | Wellisch, Dietmar. |
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| Imprint: | Cambridge, U.K. ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2000. |
| Description: | 1 online resource (x, 214 pages) : illustrations |
| Language: | English |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | E-Resource Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11130213 |
| Summary: | The central question of this book is whether the assignment of government functions to the individual jurisdictions in a federal state can ensure an optimal allocation of resources and a fair income distribution. The analysis thereby gives a new answer to the old question about the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization in a federal state. It shows that fiscal decentralization is a method to disclose the preferences of currently living and future generations for local public goods, to limit the size of the government, and to avoid excessive public debt finance. While the allocative branch of the government benefits from fiscal decentralization, it is difficult to obtain a distribution of incomes that differs from the outcome that the market brings along. |
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| Physical Description: | 1 online resource (x, 214 pages) : illustrations |
| Bibliography: | Includes bibliographical references (pages 201-210) and index. |
| ISBN: | 0511015879 9780511015878 0511117035 9780511117039 9780511613319 0511613318 9780511050909 0511050909 9780511156328 0511156324 9786610161850 6610161852 9780521026871 0521026873 9780521630351 0521630355 |