Review by Choice Review
Few contemporary philosophers can match Searle's ability to stimulate and engage both nonprofessional and professional readers. That ability is much in evidence in this short introduction to current developments in philosophy of mind. Searle (Univ. of California, Berkeley) advances the central claim that most, if not all, philosophically influential theories of mind depend, in one way or another, on mistaken assumptions about mental phenomena and their relation to the rest of the world. In a comprehensive review of prominent theories, Searle identifies some of the more important among these assumptions. This analysis provides a staging ground for presentation, in a short compass, of his own resolution of the central problems in philosophy of mind: materialism, consciousness, mental causation, free will, intentionality, perception, and self-identity. Though some features of his resolutive thought may be controversial, analysis of the shape of problems to be resolved by contemporary philosophers of mind is remarkably cogent and clear. For readers interested in further development of Searle's thought, along with other treatments of the topics in question, a short bibliography is included. Notes and index are excellent. ^BSumming Up: Highly recommended. All library collections serving general readers and upper-level undergraduates and above. J. White University of Maine
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Publisher's Weekly Review
With characteristic verve and wit, Univ. of California at Berkeley philosopher Searle (The Rediscovery of the Mind) dismantles various competing theories of mind?dualist, materialist, behaviorist and skepticist?in this opinionated overview of the philosophy of mind. His purview includes the relationship of the mind to the body, the role of perception in human understanding and the purported equivalence between mind and brain. On dualism, for example, Searle finds Descartes?s postulation of mind and body as separate spheres leaves no room for consciousness. Searle himself argues for a ?biological naturalism? that holds that ?conscious states are real phenomena in the real world.? Although the language and theory surrounding the philosophy of mind is often technical and complex, Searle?s knack for presenting dense ideas in lively prose makes this book a fine starting point for an investigation into the contemporary philosophy of mind. (Nov.) Copyright 2004 Reed Business Information.
Review by Library Journal Review
Searle (philosophy, Berkeley) offers a chatty gloss on the traditional arguments for separating the human mind from its biology and his own account of this same mind as occurring as a part of nature itself. From Descartes's dualism to materialism's contemporary struggles to cope with artificial intelligence, he limns concepts that shape not only philosophic thinking but also inform-for better or for worse-social science and scientific theories involving the mind. Conceptions of consciousness, "proofs" of intentionality and free will, and the problems of perception and identity are taken up in turn, sometimes with more casual treatment than a rigorous scholar might want of the arguments Searle proposes to demonstrate as "right." However, the intention of this book is to give general readers some understanding of where the philosophy of mind stands at the present and an invitation to think about the mind for themselves. The treatment offered here does indeed suit such a purpose, which marks this as a timely book for general collections.-Francisca Goldsmith, Berkeley P.L., CA (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
(c) Copyright Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.
Review by Kirkus Book Review
It seems fitting that the one indispensable tool of philosophy is also one of its major problems. Here's an attempt to show general readers the key issues. Searle (Philosophy/Berkeley; Mind, Language, and Society, 1998, etc.) begins by flatly stating that all the major theories of mind are false. By that he refers explicitly to dualism--Descartes' hard-and-fast distinction between the mental and the physical--and materialism, the belief that the working of the mind can be explained entirely by physical processes. The problem, according to Searle, is that both positions seem reasonable in isolation, yet neither can account for things that we experience daily. The dualist, for example, can't explain how we can perform the simplest voluntary acts, such as raising an arm; and the materialist can't explain the subjective realm of emotions, idea, and sensations that each of us inhabits. Searle gives detailed summaries of these two schools, then offers his refutations. Traditional categories of "physical" and "mental," he argues, beg the question, forcing us to believe that we must choose between alternatives. Searle's common-sense proposal: that while mind is indeed the product of physical processes of the brain, it operates on a higher level--just as the solidity of matter is a higher-level result of interactions of atoms and physical law. He labels his synthesis "biological naturalism," then goes on to discuss several of the key questions raised by modern theories of the mind: consciousness and unconsciousness, intentionality, free will, perception, the self. The reader untrained in philosophy may find much of this--in particular the discussion of intentionality--heavy going. But Searle makes a determined effort to provide real-world examples of his subject, and those who stick with him will find his insights persuasive. An often-fascinating look into a subject we all know intimately--but that even the experts don't fully understand. Copyright ©Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.
Copyright (c) Kirkus Reviews, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review
Review by Publisher's Weekly Review
Review by Library Journal Review
Review by Kirkus Book Review
