Do apes read minds? : toward a new folk psychology /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Andrews, Kristin, 1971-
Imprint:Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2012.
©2012
Description:1 online resource (xi, 294 pages)
Language:English
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11139957
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9780262305761
0262305763
9780262017558
0262017555
Digital file characteristics:data file
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
Print version record.
Summary:An argument that as folk psychologists humans (and perhaps other animals) don't so much read minds as see one another as persons with traits, emotions, and social relations. By adulthood, most of us have become experts in human behavior, able to make sense of the myriad behaviors we find in environments ranging from the family home to the local mall and beyond. In philosophy of mind, our understanding of others has been largely explained in terms of knowing others' beliefs and desires; describing others' behavior in these terms is the core of what is known as folk psychology. In Do Apes Read Minds? Kristin Andrews challenges this view of folk psychology, arguing that we don't consider others' beliefs and desires when predicting most quotidian behavior, and that our explanations in these terms are often inaccurate or unhelpful. Rather than mindreading, or understanding others as receptacles for propositional attitudes, Andrews claims that folk psychologists see others first as whole persons with traits, emotions, and social relations. Drawing on research in developmental psychology, social psychology, and animal cognition, Andrews argues for a pluralistic folk psychology that employs different kinds of practices (including prediction, explanation, and justification) and different kinds of cognitive tools (including personality trait attribution, stereotype activation, inductive reasoning about past behavior, and generalization from self) that are involved in our folk psychological practices. According to this understanding of folk psychology--which does not require the sophisticated cognitive machinery of second-order metacognition associated with having a theory of mind--animals (including the other great apes) may be folk psychologists, too.
Other form:Print version: Andrews, Kristin, 1971- Do apes read minds? Cambridge, Mass. : MIT Press, ©2012 9780262017558
Review by Choice Review

Are traditional theories of folk psychology adequate to explain how people understand one another? Should philosophical theories of mind focus solely on predicting behavior? Do humans and apes have more in common than previously thought? Andrews (York Univ., Toronto) considers each of these questions in her new book combining research in psychology, philosophy, and zoology. Specifically, Andrews challenges the traditional folk psychological notion that people understand one another as mere receptacles of propositional attitudes and instead suggests that people must do so as complete, social beings. In support of her thesis, she examines the traditional theory of folk psychology, and exposes its limitations in explaining and predicting human behavior. She then proposes her own positive theory of folk psychology--that understanding the behavior of others requires recognizing them as intentional agents and having the socio-cognitive capacity to engage with those agents. The author concludes that her approach requires an updated theory of mind and that it opens up the possibility that humankind's primate relatives share more with humans cognitively than previously thought possible. Crisply and clearly written, this enjoyable, informative work ends by offering suggestions for further research. Summing Up: Highly recommended. Upper-level undergraduates through researchers/faculty. R. K. Rowe Kaplan University

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review