Command failure in war : psychology and leadership /

In a remarkable collaboration, historian Pois and educational psychologist Langer (both of the Univ. of Colorado, Boulder) demonstrate the explanatory role of psychology in the historical analysis of military failures. In eight case studies, ranging from Frederick the Great at Kunersdorf to Lee at Gettysburg, from Sir Douglas Haig in World War I to Hitler and his generals at Stalingrad, the authors analyze the psychological state of the defeated commanders. They do not attempt to apply an all-encompassing form of psychological dysfunction to all eight studies but instead draw upon different psychological approaches appropriate to the individual and circumstance. The authors do conclude that common to each leader's dysfunctionality was an inflexible adherence to old beliefs and mindsets. Less convincing is their suggestion that this same single-minded inflexibility, as practiced in the costly "wearing down" campaigns on the western front and the British Bomber Command's strategic area bombing of World War II, may have been an unavoidable necessity for achieving final victory. Nevertheless, this scholarly work is superior in its historical sources and more incisive in its varied psychological approaches than Norman Dixon's landmark On the Psychology of Military Incompetence. Recommended for larger public libraries and academic libraries supporting history and psychology programs.-Edward Metz, USACGSC Combined Arms Research Lib., Ft. Leavenworth, KS (c) Copyright 2010. Library Journals LLC, a wholly owned subsidiary of Media Source, Inc. No redistribution permitted.