Beyond consequentialism /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Hurley, Paul (Paul E.)
Imprint:Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2011, ©2009.
Description:1 online resource (viii, 275 pages)
Language:English
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11142783
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9780191571787
0191571784
9780199698431
0199698430
9780199559305
0199559309
Notes:"First published 2009. First published in paperback 2011"--Title page verso.
Includes bibliographical references (pages 264-269) and index.
Print version record.
Summary:Hurley sets out a radical challenge to consequentialism, the theory which might seem to be the default option in contemporary moral philosophy. There is an unresolved tension within the theory: if consequentialists are right about the content of morality, then morality cannot have the rational authority that even they take it to have.
Other form:Print version: Hurley, Paul (Paul E.). Beyond consequentialism. Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2011, ©2009 9780199698431
Description
Summary:Consequentialism, the theory that morality requires us to promote the best overall outcome, is the default alternative in contemporary moral philosophy, and is highly influential in public discourses beyond academic philosophy. Paul Hurley argues that current discussions of the challenge consequentialism tend to overlook a fundamental challenge to consequentialism. The standard consequentialist account of the content of morality, he argues, cannot be reconciled to the authoritativeness of moral standards for rational agents. If rational agents typically have decisive reasons to do what morality requires, then consequentialism cannot be the correct account of moral standards. Hurley builds upon this challenge to argue that the consequentialist case for grounding the impartial evaluation of actions in the impartial evaluation of outcomes is built upon a set of subtle and mutually reinforcing mistakes. Through exposing these mistakes and misappropriations, he undermines consequentialist arguments against alternative approaches that recognize a conception of impartiality appropriate to the evaluation of actions which is distinct from the impartiality appropriate to the evaluation of outcomes. A moral theory that recognizes a fundamental role for such a distinct conception of impartiality can account for the rational authority of moral standards, but does so, Hurley argues, by taking morality beyond consequentialism in both its standard and non-standard forms.
Item Description:"First published 2009. First published in paperback 2011"--Title page verso.
Physical Description:1 online resource (viii, 275 pages)
Bibliography:Includes bibliographical references (pages 264-269) and index.
ISBN:9780191571787
0191571784
9780199698431
0199698430
9780199559305
0199559309