Essays in the metaphysics of modality /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Plantinga, Alvin.
Imprint:	Oxford ; New York : Oxford University Press, 2003.
Description:	1 online resource (vi, 239 pages)
Language:	English
Subject:	Modality (Logic) Metaphysics. Metaphysics. Modality (Logic) Electronic books.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11144171

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Davidson, Matthew, 1972- Oxford University Press.
ISBN:	0195103769 9780195103762 0195103777 9780195103779 9780198026389 0198026382 1281930148 9781281930149
Notes:	A collection of previously published articles from 1969 to 1993. Includes bibliographical references and index. Print version record.
Summary:	This book is a collection of my essays, dating from 1969, concerning the metaphysics of modality. The first two chapters are a defense of the idea of modality de re against criticisms from William Kneale and W.V. Quine, and an elaboration on the notions of possible worlds and essences. In the third chapter, I conclude that the Theory of Worldbound Individuals is false, even when fortified with Counterpart Theory. Chapter 4 contains an argument for the conclusion that there neither are, nor could have been, possible but nonexistent objects. In the next chapter, I develop this theme in greater detail and argue for the compatibility of actualism -- i.e., the view that there neither are, nor could have been, any nonexistent objects --and possible worlds. Both Chs. 6 and 7 contain an account of the relationship between proper names and essences, my view being that proper names express essences and that sometimes different proper names for the same object express different essences of that object. The end of Ch. 7 and all of Ch. 8 are an examination of existentialism (the theory that propositions and states of affairs ontologically depend on their subjects) and arguments against it. In Ch. 9, I defend my theory of modality against objections raised by John Pollock. In Ch. 10, I sketch out what the commitments of modal realism are, and argue that David Lewis's modal theory is not a modal realist theory. Finally, in the concluding chapter I argue that propositions cannot be concrete objects.
Other form:	Plantinga, Alvin. Essays in the metaphysics of modality. Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2003

Table of Contents:

Acknowledgments
Essays in the Metaphysics of Modality
Introduction
Notes
References
1. De Re Et De Dicto
Notes
2. World and Essence
Notes
3. Transworld Identity or Worldbound Individuals?
Notes
4. Possible but Unactual Objects: on What There Isn't
Notes
5. Actualism and Possible Worlds
Notes
References
6. The Boethian Compromise
Notes
7. De Essentia
Notes
8. On Existentialism
Notes
9. Replies to My Colleagues
Notes
10. Modal Realism and Modal Reductionism
Notes
References
11. Why Propositions Cannot Be Concrete
Notes
Index

Essays in the metaphysics of modality /

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