A defense of abortion /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Boonin, David.
Imprint:Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2003.
Description:1 online resource (xvi, 350 pages)
Language:English
Series:Cambridge studies in philosophy and public policy
Cambridge studies in philosophy and public policy.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11144265
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:0521817013
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Digital file characteristics:data file
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 325-343) and index.
English.
Print version record.
Summary:David Boonin has written the most thorough and detailed case for the moral permissibility of abortion yet published. This major book will be especially helpful to those teaching applied ethics and bioethics in philosophy or in law and medicine and to general readers for whom abortion remains a high-profile issue.
Other form:Print version: Boonin, David. Defense of abortion. Cambridge, UK ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2003
Review by Choice Review

This book should become the new philosophical standard for the moral permissibility of abortion. Boonin (Univ. of Colorado, Boulder) makes a carefully detailed case against the main antiabortion arguments, presenting a well-argued defense of abortion. His book is copiously documented. Chapter 1 explains his methodological approach. Chapter 2 considers arguments against abortion based on the claim that the fetus has a right to life from conception and finds that each fails on its own terms. Chapter 3 examines arguments against abortion based on the premise that the fetus acquires the right to life after conception, concluding that the fetus acquires this right when its brain reaches a level of maturity based on consciousness sometime late in pregnancy. Consequently, chapters 2 and 3 contend that the central claim needed to sustain the rights-based argument against abortion fails by the abortion critic's own terms. Chapter 4 argues that even if the fetus has a right to life, abortion is permissible in most actual cases. Therefore, even if the analyses of chapters 2 and 3 fail, the rights-based argument against abortion still fails. Chapter 5 considers nonrights-based arguments against abortion and finds them lacking. Summing Up: Highly recommended. Upper-division undergraduates through professionals. R. Werner Hamilton College

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review