Moral realities : an essay in philosophical psychology /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Platts, Mark de Bretton, 1947-
Imprint:London ; New York : Routledge, 1991.
Description:1 online resource (viii, 232 pages)
Language:English
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11155925
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:0203980603
9780203980606
9780415058926
0415058929
0415058929
1134930690
9781134930692
1280225432
9781280225437
9786610225439
6610225435
Digital file characteristics:data file
Notes:Includes bibliographical references (pages 226-229) and index.
English.
Print version record.
Summary:Philosophical critics have consistently misidentified the institution of morality. Platts argues that a `realist' standpoint of moral thought was possible from the perspective of the philosophy of psychology.
Other form:Print version: Platts, Mark de Bretton, 1947- Moral realities. London ; New York : Routledge, 1991
Review by Choice Review

Platts (National Autonomous University of Mexico) attacks moral skepticism, moral subjectivism, and moral relativism; he defends moral realism. The book has two parts. The first, which investigates timeless, conceptual relationships among wanting, reasons, valuing, etc., is an exercise in what might be called philosophical psychology or the metaphysics of value. The second part addresses what Platts calls the reach of morality and analyzes and criticizes those philosophers Platts takes to be critics of morality: Hume, Mandeville, and Nietzsche, as well as contemporary philosophers such as Gilbert Harman and Bernard Williams. Platts wants to discover the theory that is internal to moral thought and practice; this he sees as a necessary first step to the assessment of morality itself and of the effectiveness of the skeptical attacks on morality by certain philosophers. Appropriate for upper-division undergraduate and graduate students in philosophy.-S. Satris, Clemson University

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review