The verdict of battle : the law of victory and the making of modern war /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Whitman, James Q., 1957-
Imprint:Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2012.
Description:1 online resource (323 pages)
Language:English
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11162136
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9780674068117
0674068114
9780674067141
0674067142
0674416872
9780674416871
Digital file characteristics:text file PDF
Notes:Includes bibliographical references and index.
In English.
Print version record.
Summary:Slaughter in battle was once seen as a legitimate way to settle disputes. When pitched battles ceased to exist, the law of victory gave way to the rule of unbridled force. Whitman explains why ritualized violence was more effective in ending carnage, and why humanitarian laws that view war as evil have led to longer, more barbaric conflicts.
Today, war is considered a last resort for resolving disagreements. But a day of staged slaughter on the battlefield was once seen as a legitimate means of settling political disputes. James Whitman argues that pitched battle was essentially a trial with a lawful verdict. And when this contained form of battle ceased to exist, the law of victory gave way to the rule of unbridled force. The Verdict of Battle explains why the ritualized violence of the past was more effective than modern warfare in bringing carnage to an end, and why humanitarian laws that cling to a notion of war as evil have led to longer, more barbaric conflicts. Belief that sovereigns could, by rights, wage war for profit made the eighteenth century battle's golden age. A pitched battle was understood as a kind of legal proceeding in which both sides agreed to be bound by the result. To the victor went the spoils, including the fate of kingdoms. But with the nineteenth-century decline of monarchical legitimacy and the rise of republican sentiment, the public no longer accepted the verdict of pitched battles. Ideology rather than politics became war's just cause. And because modern humanitarian law provided no means for declaring a victor or dispensing spoils at the end of battle, the violence of war dragged on. The most dangerous wars, Whitman asserts in this iconoclastic tour de force, are the lawless wars we wage today to remake the world in the name of higher moral imperatives.
Other form:Print version: Whitman, James Q., 1957- Verdict of battle. Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 2012 9780674067141
Standard no.:10.4159/harvard.9780674068117
Review by Choice Review

Military historians have traditionally explained the evolution of warfare from the limited wars of the 18th century to the total wars of the 20th century in terms of the emergence of mass conscript armies or new forms of strategy. Yale law professor Whitman rejects those explanations in favor of a legal approach, claiming that limited wars arose when European monarchs accepted as law the principle that victory in pitched battle gave the victor the legal rights to the spoils of war and reduced if not eliminated the need for further destruction. He concludes that the system broke down with the rise of republican governments that rejected wars for profit and placed a "just cause" theory in its place. This argument may satisfy legal scholars, but military historians will be far less impressed, and will be puzzled by Whitman's criticism that they "focus on the events of the battlefield itself" and are able to explain how a battle was won, but not what was won. Military historians will be even more troubled that Whitman's case for 18th-century warfare rests on superficial sketches of only three battles that he does not place in any strategic or political context. Summing Up: Recommended. Specialized collections only. R. H. Larson Lycoming College

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review