Reference and description : the case against two-dimensionalism /

Soames (Univ. of Southern California) offers a careful defense of the pioneering work of Kripke, Putnam, and Kaplan against (1) the revival of descriptivism in philosophy of language, (2) internalism in philosophy of mind, and (3) conceptualism in modal logic. Soames explains how work in these areas has focused recently on a two-dimensional modal logic that seeks to weaken Kripke's famous arguments for the necessary a posteriori and contingent a priori. Part 1 reviews the revolt against Frege and Russell's descriptivism by Kripke and Kaplan. Part 2 lays out the strategies for a descriptivist revival as either strong or weak two-dimensionalism. It includes a critical discussion of Robert Stalnaker's work, along with that of Martin Davies and Lloyd Humberstone. Part 3 defines strong and weak forms of two-dimensionalism. Soames considers Frank Jackson's strong two-dimensionalism and its application to his defense of physicalism. He discusses David Chalmer's inconclusive "Zombie Argument" for dualism and his more recent work on propositional attitudes. Soames also systematically critiques all forms of ambitious two-dimensionalism. In Part 4 he concludes with his own "positive non-descriptivist" answers to several problems and indicates where further work is needed. A text of this scope and care is a must for any program supporting philosophy of language and mind. ^BSumming Up: Highly recommended. Upper-level undergraduates through faculty/researchers. R. M. Stewart Austin College