After Saddam : prewar planning and the occupation of Iraq /

After Saddam : prewar planning and the occupation of Iraq /

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Bibliographic Details
Imprint:	Santa Monica, CA : Rand Arroyo Center, 2008.
Description:	1 online resource (xxxvii, 273 pages) : illustrations, maps
Language:	English
Series:	Rand Corporation monograph series Rand Corporation monograph series.
Subject:	Coalition Provisional Authority. Coalition Provisional Authority. Iraq War, 2003-2011. Military planning -- United States. Postwar reconstruction -- Iraq. Insurgency -- Iraq. National security -- Iraq. Insurgency. Military planning. National security. Postwar reconstruction. Iraq. United States. Electronic books.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11194622

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Bensahel, Nora, 1971- United States. Army.
ISBN:	9780833046383 0833046381 9780833044587 0833044583
Digital file characteristics:	text file PDF
Notes:	"Prepared for the United States Army." "MG-642-A"--Page 4 of cover. Includes bibliographical references (pages 255-273). Print version record.
Summary:	This monograph begins by examining prewar planning efforts or postwar Iraq, in order to establish what U.S. policymakers expected the postwar situation to look like and what their plans were for reconstruction. The monograph then examines the role of U.S. military forces after major combat officially ended on May 1, 2003; the analysis covers this period through the end of June 2004. Finally, the monograph examines civilian efforts at reconstruction after major combat ended, focusing on the activities of the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and its efforts to rebuilding structures of governance, security forces, economic policy, and essential services prior to June 28, 2004, the day that the CPA dissolved and transferred authority to the Interim Iraqi Government. The authors conclude that the U.S. government was unprepared for the challenges of postwar Iraq for three reasons: a failure to challenge fundamental assumptions about postwar Iraq; ineffective interagency coordination; and the failure to assign responsibility and resources for providing security in the immediate aftermath of major combat operations.
Other form:	Print version: After Saddam. Santa Monica, CA : Rand Arroyo Center, 2008 9780833044587 0833044583
Standard no.:	9786612033230

Table of Contents:

Military planning efforts
Civilian planning efforts
Task Force IV
The Office of Reconstruction and Humanitarian Assistance
Humanitarian planning
Combat operations during Phase IV
The Coalition Provisional Authority
Building new Iraqi security forces
Governance and political reconstruction
Economic policy
Essential services and infrastructure
Assessing postwar efforts.