Order without law : how neighbors settle disputes /

Order without law : how neighbors settle disputes /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Ellickson, Robert C.
Imprint:Cambridge, Mass. ; London : Harvard University Press, 1991 (1994 [printing])
Description:1 online resource (ix, 302 pages)
Language:English
Subject:
Social norms.
Social control.
Neighborliness.
Conflict management.
Quarreling.
Dispute resolution (Law)
Compromise (Law)
Sociological jurisprudence.
Compromise (Law)
Conflict management.
Dispute resolution (Law)
Neighborliness.
Quarreling.
Social control.
Social norms.
Sociological jurisprudence.
Electronic books.
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11197234
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:9780674036437
0674036433
Notes:Includes index.
Print version record.
Summary:Integrating the current research in law, economics, sociology, game theory and anthropology, this text demonstrates that people largely govern themselves by means of informal rules - social norms - without the need for a state or other central co-ordinator to lay down the law.
In Order without Law Robert C. Ellickson shows that law is far less important than is generally thought. He demonstrates that people largely govern themselves by means of informal rules-social norms-that develop without the aid of a state or other central coordinator. Integrating the latest scholarship in law, economics, sociology, game theory, and anthropology, Ellickson investigates the uncharted world within which order is successfully achieved without law. The springboard for Ellickson's theory of norms is his close investigation of a variety of disputes arising from the damage created by escaped cattle in Shasta County, California. In "The Problem of Social Cost" --the most frequently cited article on law--economist Ronald H. Cease depicts farmers and ranchers as bargaining in the shadow of the law while resolving cattle-trespass disputes. Ellickson's field study of this problem refutes many of the behavioral assumptions that underlie Coase's vision, and will add realism to future efforts to apply economic analysis to law. Drawing examples from a wide variety of social contexts, including whaling grounds, photocopying centers, and landlord-tenant relations, Ellickson explores the interaction between informal and legal rules and the usual domains in which these competing systems are employed. Order without Law firmly grounds its analysis in real-world events, while building a broad theory of how people cooperate to mutual advantage.
Other form:Print version: Ellickson, Robert C. Order without law. Cambridge, Mass. ; London : Harvard University Press, 1991 0674641698 9780674641693
Review by Choice Review

Ellickson (law, Yale) examines how disputes arising from property damage created by escaped cattle are understood and negotiated by farmers in Shasta County, California. Research reported in the book challenges a central proposition of law and economics scholarship the Coase Theorem holding that people bargain to mutual advantage from starting points established by legal entitlements. Field work (e.g., 73 interviews with landowners, lawyers, claims adjusters, and government employees) suggests that legal rules, doctrine, and formal procedures play little or no role as landowners confront and work through their problems. People develop mutual understandings of their situation by means of informal rules and adaptive norms of neighborliness that develop without reference to law. The insight that law frequently is peripheral has gained widespread acceptance in the sociological and anthropological literature (e.g., Carol J. Greenhouse, Praying for Justice, CH, May'87), but Ellickson attempts to bring the insights of law and society research to law and economics scholarship. Field work is used to develop a "general theory of social control, " which, drawing on game theory and based on assumptions from rational choice models, should contribute to law and economics work on disputes. Footnotes, but no bibliography. Recommended for graduate collections in economics.-M. Kessler, Bates College

Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review

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