Is truth the primary epistemic goal? /

Is truth the primary epistemic goal? /

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Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:	Hess, Markus Patrick.
Imprint:	Frankfurt : Ontos Verlag, ©2010.
Description:	1 online resource (165 pages)
Language:	English
Series:	Epistemische Studien : Schriften zue Erkenntnis- und Wissenschaftstheorie ; Bd. 17 Epistemische Studien (Frankfurt am Main, Germany) ; Bd. 17.
Subject:	Truth. Knowledge, Theory of. Goal (Philosophy) Goal (Philosophy) Knowledge, Theory of. Truth. Electronic books.
Format:	E-Resource Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11201241

Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:	9783110329551 3110329557 3868380620 9783868380620 3110329387 9783110329384 9783868380620 9783110329384
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references.
Summary:	This book is focused on a problem that has aroused the most controversy in recent epistemological debate, which is whether the truth can or cannot be the fundamental epistemic goal. Traditional epistemology has presupposed the centrality of truth without giving a deeper analysis. To epistemic value pluralists, the claim that truth is the fundamental value seems unjustified. Their central judgement is that we can be in a situation where we do not attain truth but something else that is also epistemically valuable. In contrast, epistemic value monists are committed to the view that one can only.
Other form:	Print version: Hess, Markus Patrick. Is Truth the Primary Epistemic Goal? Berlin : De Gruyter, ©2010 9783110329384

Table of Contents:

1. Introduction; 2. Can Truth Be an Epistemic Goal?; 3. The Value of Truth; 4. Requirements of the Truth Goal; 5. The Primacy of the Truth Goal; 6. Alternative Monism; 7. The Value of Knowledge; 8. Conclusion; 9. Appendix: Overcoming the Problem of Epistemic Relativism; Bibliography.