Trapped in the net : the unanticipated consequences of computerization /

An important contribution to the discussion of the "unanticipated consequences [and] direct and indirect costs of increased dependence on computers," this book is written with a stylistic grace that is rare in this genre. Rochlin's beautiful, concise history of personal computers and networks is followed by an analysis of the consequent "emergence of new modes of organizational control." Two lucid and insightful chapters on the computerization of the financial markets focus on the deepening loss of human control it has engendered. This theme is further pursued in the chapter on automation of airplane cockpits and of air traffic control rooms. Four chapters trace the evolution of the military, from the Civil War to the Gulf War, to a fully computerized "command, control, communications, and intelligence" operation with the resultant increase in cost and decrease in robustness against errors and surprises. The often fascinating endnotes and an extensive, eclectic bibliography cover 70 pages. This book is such a thoughtful, informative, and evenhanded "exploration of [the] longer-term systemic and societal implications" of the use of computer systems that it should be studied by everyone who uses them or controls their use. All levels. J. Mayer; formerly, Lebanon Valley College

Rochlin's is a voice of caution in a full-speed-ahead world, reminding us that greater dependence on computers implies greater disasters when they fail. He cites some alarming incidents and argues for some forethought and fail-safe measures before things get worse.

HAL the computer may not really be scheming to do us all in, but, according to University of California energy and resources professor Rochlin, computerization is leading us into pretty dire straits. In financial markets, warp-speed automated trading creates opportunities for fraud and moves us further away from a stable investment climate. In the office, computers promise efficiency, but bring fragmented knowledge and reduced autonomy to workers. There's worse news. Pilots in the "glass cockpits" of modern airplanes have too much data to interpret, and nuclear power plant operators are less likely to have an intuitive feel for things going wrong "on the floor." Most sobering of all is the discussion of automation and the military. In a provocative analysis of the 1991 Persian Gulf War, Rochlin argues that the success of American smart weapons was due to atypical circumstances‘enormous preparation and inflow of resources, clear weather and lack of resistance by Iraq. In future campaigns, the "fog of war" might make such precise operations impossible. At times, Rochlin's broad-brush coverage leaves one hungry for detail, and his professorial style may even detract from the urgency of his message. As for solutions to our increasing dilemma, readers are left on their own. Gloomily, Rochlin just asserts that without paying "substantial costs," "there is no way that we can pull the plug." (May) (c) Copyright PWxyz, LLC. All rights reserved