Review by Choice Review
In this ambitious work, Goldstick (emer., Univ. of Toronto) advances a complex yet bold defense of pre-Kantian rationalism in the tradition of Roderick Chisholm and Brand Blanshard. The book is divided into three main parts. Goldstick's primary objective in the first part is to show that one's thinking depends on a set of deductive, inductive, and ethical principles, which, though requiring rational assent, cannot be squared with empiricism. The second part is devoted to the presuppositions of induction, which, Goldstick argues, rationally requires universal causality as well as spatiotemporally interconnected and universal change. The third and final part takes up various issues in ethics and culminates in a defense of utilitarianism. Continental philosophers likely will discover little of interest here, but those of an analytic bent undoubtedly will find engaging the rigor and polemical force of Goldstick's arguments. Among the book's chief themes are rationalism, aprioricity, and antiscepticism; its topics include the relationship between belief and desire, the problem of induction, and epistemic reliability. Two brief appendixes ("Tautology" and "Desire") round out this philosophically dense yet unified and ultimately rewarding text. Summing Up: Recommended. Advanced upper-level undergraduates through faculty/researchers. F. A. Grabowski Rogers State University
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review
