Economics and computation : an introduction to algorithmic game theory, computational social choice, and fair division /
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| Imprint: | Heidelberg : Springer, [2015] ©2016 |
|---|---|
| Description: | 1 online resource (xiii, 612 pages) : illustrations (some color) |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Springer texts in business and economics, 2192-4333 Springer texts in business and economics, |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | E-Resource Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11247679 |
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| 245 | 0 | 0 | |a Economics and computation : |b an introduction to algorithmic game theory, computational social choice, and fair division / |c Jörg Rothe, editor ; illustrations by Irene Rothe. |
| 264 | 1 | |a Heidelberg : |b Springer, |c [2015] | |
| 264 | 4 | |c ©2016 | |
| 300 | |a 1 online resource (xiii, 612 pages) : |b illustrations (some color) | ||
| 336 | |a text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
| 337 | |a computer |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
| 338 | |a online resource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
| 490 | 1 | |a Springer texts in business and economics, |x 2192-4333 | |
| 504 | |a Includes bibliographical references and index. | ||
| 588 | 0 | |a Online resource; title from PDF title page (SpringerLink, viewed August 24, 2015). | |
| 505 | 0 | |a Intro; Foreword by Matthew O. Jackson and Yoav Shoham; Preface by the Editor; Contents; Contributors; Chapter 1 Playing, Voting, and Dividing; 1.1 Playing; 1.1.1 Noncooperative Game Theory; 1.1.2 Cooperative Game Theory; 1.2 Voting; 1.2.1 Preference Aggregation by Voting; 1.2.2 Manipulative Actions in Single-Peaked Societies; 1.2.3 Judgment Aggregation; 1.3 Dividing; 1.3.1 Cake-cutting: Fair Division of Divisible Goods; 1.3.2 Fair Division of Indivisible Goods; 1.3.3 A Brief Digression to Single-Item Auctions; 1.3.3.1 Classification; 1.3.3.2 English Auction; 1.3.3.3 Dutch Auction | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 1.3.3.4 Vickrey Auction1.3.3.5 American Auction; 1.3.3.6 Expected Revenue; 1.4 Some Literature Pointers; 1.5 A Brief Digression to Computational Complexity; 1.5.1 Some Foundations of Complexity Theory; 1.5.1.1 Turing Machines and Complexity Measures; 1.5.1.2 The Complexity Classes P and NP; 1.5.1.3 Upper and Lower Bounds; 1.5.2 The Satisfiability Problem of Propositional Logic; 1.5.2.1 Definitions; 1.5.2.2 Upper Bounds for SAT; 1.5.2.3 How to Prove Lower Bounds: Reducibility and Hardness; 1.5.2.4 Some Background on Approximation Theory; 1.5.3 A Brief Compendium of Complexity Classes | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 1.5.3.1 Polynomial Space1.5.3.2 The Polynomial Hierarchy; 1.5.3.3 DP: the Second Level of the Boolean Hierarchy over NP; 1.5.3.4 Probabilistic Polynomial Time; Overview; 1.5.3.5 And Now, Finally, . . .; Part I Playing Successfully; Chapter 2 Noncooperative Game Theory; 2.1 Foundations; 2.1.1 Normal Form, Dominant Strategies, and Equilibria; 2.1.1.1 The Prisoners' Dilemma; 2.1.1.2 Noncooperative Games in Normal Form; 2.1.1.3 Dominant Strategies; 2.1.1.4 Nash Equilibria in Pure Strategies; 2.1.1.5 Relations between Solution Concepts; 2.1.2 Further Two-Player Games | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 2.1.2.1 The Battle of the Sexes2.1.2.2 The Chicken Game; 2.1.2.3 The Penalty Game; 2.1.2.4 The Paper-Rock-Scissors Game; 2.1.2.5 The Guessing Numbers Game; 2.2 Nash Equilibria in Mixed Strategies; 2.2.1 Definition and Application to Two-Player Games; 2.2.1.1 Definition of Nash Equilibria in Mixed Strategies; 2.2.1.2 The Penalty Game; 2.2.1.3 The Paper-Rock-Scissors Game; 2.2.1.4 The Battle of the Sexes; 2.2.1.5 The Chicken Game; 2.2.1.6 The Prisoners' Dilemma; 2.2.1.7 Overview of Some Properties of Some Two-Player Games; 2.2.2 Existence of Nash Equilibria in Mixed Strategies | |
| 505 | 8 | |a 2.2.2.1 Definition of Some Notions from Mathematical Topology2.2.2.2 Sperner's Lemma and Brouwer's Fixed Point Theorem; 2.2.2.3 Nash's Theorem; 2.3 Checkmate: Trees for Games with Perfect Information; 2.3.1 Sequential Two-Player Games; 2.3.1.1 Game Trees; 2.3.1.2 Tic-Tac-Toe; 2.3.1.3 Nim; 2.3.1.4 Geography and the Hardness of Finding Winning Strategies; 2.3.2 Equilibria in Game Trees; 2.3.2.1 Edgar's Sequential Campaign Game; 2.3.2.2 Nash Equilibria in Edgar's Sequential Campaign Game; 2.3.2.3 Subgame-Perfect Equilibria; 2.4 Full House: Games with Incomplete Information | |
| 520 | 3 | |a This textbook connects three vibrant areas at the interface between economics and computer science: algorithmic game theory, computational social choice, and fair division. It thus offers an interdisciplinary treatment of collective decision making from an economic and computational perspective. Part I introduces to algorithmic game theory, focusing on both noncooperative and cooperative game theory. Part II introduces to computational social choice, focusing on both preference aggregation (voting) and judgment aggregation. Part III introduces to fair division, focusing on the division of both a single divisible resource ("cake-cutting") and multiple indivisible and unshareable resources ("multiagent resource allocation"). In all these parts, much weight is given to the algorithmic and complexity-theoretic aspects of problems arising in these areas, and the interconnections between the three parts are of central interest. | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Economics, Mathematical. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85040869 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Econometrics. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85040763 | |
| 650 | 0 | |a Game theory. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/subjects/sh85052941 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Econometrics. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst00901574 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Economics, Mathematical. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst00902260 | |
| 650 | 7 | |a Game theory. |2 fast |0 (OCoLC)fst00937501 | |
| 653 | 0 | 0 | |a politieke economie |
| 653 | 0 | 0 | |a political economy |
| 653 | 0 | 0 | |a economie |
| 653 | 0 | 0 | |a economics |
| 653 | 0 | 0 | |a bedrijfswetenschap |
| 653 | 0 | 0 | |a management science |
| 653 | 0 | 0 | |a algoritmen |
| 653 | 0 | 0 | |a algorithms |
| 653 | 0 | 0 | |a computeranalyse |
| 653 | 0 | 0 | |a computer analysis |
| 653 | 0 | 0 | |a speltheorie |
| 653 | 0 | 0 | |a game theory |
| 653 | 0 | 0 | |a wiskunde |
| 653 | 0 | 0 | |a mathematics |
| 653 | 0 | 0 | |a public finance |
| 653 | 1 | 0 | |a Management studies, Business Administration, Organizational Science (General) |
| 653 | 2 | 0 | |a Economics (General) |
| 653 | 1 | 0 | |a Management, bedrijfskunde, organisatiekunde (algemeen) |
| 653 | 2 | 0 | |a Economie (algemeen) |
| 655 | 4 | |a Electronic books. | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Rothe, Jörg, |e editor. |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2005089809 | |
| 700 | 1 | |a Rothe, Irene, |e illustrator. | |
| 830 | 0 | |a Springer texts in business and economics, |x 2192-4333 |0 http://id.loc.gov/authorities/names/no2011127990 | |
| 903 | |a HeVa | ||
| 929 | |a oclccm | ||
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| 928 | |t Library of Congress classification |a HB135 |l Online |c UC-FullText |u https://link.springer.com/10.1007/978-3-662-47904-9 |z Springer Nature |g ebooks |i 12532466 | ||