View this excerpt in pdf format | Copyright information On Appetite, the Right to Life, and Rational Ethics John M. Coetzee [The Death of the Animal includes responses from a varitey of philosophers and writers. Below is a response from J. M. Coetzee ] (1) When one is misunderstood it is usually because one has expressed oneself badly. So let me reiterate: there are human beings who, pushed into a corner, may be induced to say that it is the possession of reason that defines humanity, but who prefer not to be pushed into corners, and who at other moments in their lives, sometimes through words but far more often through their behavior, give expression to a conviction that we are most ourselves (meaning specifically that we as human beings are most ourselves) when we are living ourselves out most fully, or, as I earlier put it, are "brawling and guzzling and fucking" in our human way, just as "animals" (their way of putting it) are most themselves when they are doing the equivalent in their own animal way. The more radical among such folk might even go on to say that to them what makes animal flesh better to eat than other food is precisely that another being has had to die in order for them to be fed: in effect, that by devouring not just the material residue of another being but the life of that being too, they are made more full of life themselves. Philosophizing--it seems to me--is an activity unique in that it does not start out by demarcating its territory, putting bounds around itself. Thus it seems to me a legitimately philosophical problem how one is to confront an opponent who in some respects--e.g., where the satisfying of his/her human appetites is concerned -- gives little or no weight to reasoning and the fruits of reasoning. ... (2) The question of rights. The paramount right is the right to life. In the case of domesticated animals, there is a twist to their right to life that is not always recognized. For the breeding of such animals, particularly livestock, is tightly controlled by the people who own them (own them body and soul). In practice this means that animals are called into being as dictated by the market (the market for their.esh). If tomorrow we approved and enforced a right to life for livestock, the immediate e. ect would be a moratorium on births as livestock owners cut back on no longer pro.table herds. To put the case in an extreme form: a right to life for pigs means that within a few years the only pigs left on earth will be in zoos and sanctuaries. I don't see why it should be a diversion (as Harlan Miller claims) to reflect on the consequences of pushing for a right to life in the absence of a right to multiply. The right to life is usually taken to mean something like: if I am alive then I should not be deprived of my life. But in the case of livestock this interpretation is far too superficial. Which is better: not to be born at all, or to be born and then have one's throat cut in atrocious circumstances in early adolescence? Unimaginable though it may be, we should nevertheless try to imagine that choice being placed before each individual being--each, so to speak, pre-living individual being. I find it hard to imagine any one of us (whatever "us" may mean in this context) saying, "Better never to be born at all." It is the nature of life to live. I am reminded of the image (Christian in origin, though no doubt heretical) of clouds of souls waiting to be born, calling on us (men and women) to bring them into the world by the only means known, incarnation. Who are we to deny these souls entry? (This may also be used as an argument against contraception, though I doubt that the mainstream Church would be prepared to use it.) ... (3) Regarding the project of a rational ethics, so thoroughly interrogated by Cary Wolfe, it is worth saying that there are people (among whom I number myself ) who believe that our ethical impulses are prerational (I would be tempted to go along with Wordsworth and say that our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting, that what Wordsworth calls our moral being is more deeply founded within us than rationality itself ), and that all that a rational ethics can achieve is to articulate and give form to ethical impulses. Let me add that I by no means claim such an ethical foundation to the soul to be human and human alone. Many animals can clearly tell between just and unjust actions, at least as far as these directly affect them. ... (4) Regarding rights for nonhuman animals, enshrined in law, as a way of making the world a better place, let me simply put the question: if one actually wishes to bring about such rights, which is likely to be the more efficacious way of arguing for them: in the manner of the academic philosopher or in the manner of the parliamentary politician, that is to say, mixing true reasoning with verbal trickery, selective deployment of evidence, appeals to emotion, ad hominem attacks, and the denigration and browbeating of opponents? ... COPYRIGHT NOTICE : Published by Columbia University Press and copyrighted (c) 2009 Columbia University Press. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced in any form by any electronic or mechanical means (including photocopying, recording, or information storage and retrieval) without permission in writing from the publisher, except for reading and browsing via the World Wide Web. Users are not permitted to mount this file on any network servers. For more information, please e-mail us or visit the permissions page on our Web site. Excerpted from The Death of the Animal: A Dialogue by Paola Cavalieri All rights reserved by the original copyright owners. Excerpts are provided for display purposes only and may not be reproduced, reprinted or distributed without the written permission of the publisher.
