Corporate governance and corporate behavior in Japan : the consequences of stock options and corporate diversification /

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Author / Creator:Hanazaki, Masaharu, author.
Imprint:Japan : Springer, [2016]
Description:1 online resource
Language:English
Series:SpringerBriefs in economics. Development Bank of Japan research series
SpringerBriefs in economics.
Subject:
Format: E-Resource Book
URL for this record:http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11265944
Hidden Bibliographic Details
ISBN:4431560068
9784431560067
4431560041
9784431560043
Digital file characteristics:text file PDF
Notes:Includes bibliographical references.
Online resource; title from digital title page (viewed on Aug. 25, 2016).
Summary:This book carefully examines the effects of changes in the corporate governance structure on corporate behavior or company performance, using micro-data from listed companies in Japan. The author found that in Japan the introduction of stock options had neither a positive impact on profitability nor the negative side effects of promoting risk-taking behaviors. Furthermore, he found that corporate diversification and division of corporations showed negative impacts on profitability. The corporate governance structure of Japan has exhibited a large change from the second half of the 1990s to the present. There have been institutional reforms involving enterprise law, such as the introduction of stock options and the removal of the ban on holding companies. With respect to the ownership structure of a company, discernible trends are that the equity holdings of financial institutions and business corporations have fallen while the presence of foreign stockholders has risen. These trends are often pointed out as signs that the Japanese corporate governance structure has been approaching the American model and that this will energize Japanese firms. The author contradicts common academic theories, however, and concludes that the formation of the corporate governance which emphasizes the agency problem between shareholders and corporate managers is inadequate. He suggests that an institutional arrangement for a corporate governance system that values a variety of stakeholders' interests is greatly needed and concludes that perspectives on maximizing surplus values for various stakeholders and distributing the surpluses appropriately among the stakeholders will become increasingly important for the purpose of managing corporations.
Other form:Print version: Hanazaki, Masaharu. Corporate governance and corporate behavior in Japan. Japan : Springer, [2016] 4431560041 9784431560043
Standard no.:10.1007/978-4-431-56006-7
10.1007/978-4-431-56
Table of Contents:
  • Preface; Acknowledgments; Contents; About the Author; 1 Introduction; Abstract; References; 2 Institutional Characteristics and Effects of a Stock Option; Abstract; 2.1 What Is a Stock Option?; 2.2 The Development of the Stock Option System in Japan; 2.3 Stock Option Studies on Japanese Firms; References; 3 Empirical Analysis of a Stock Option; Abstract; 3.1 Estimation of Stock Option Value; 3.1.1 Basic Model; 3.1.2 Estimation Approach; 3.1.3 Estimation Results; 3.2 Has the Profitability of Companies Improved by the Introduction of a Stock Option?
  • 3.3 Did the Introduction of a Stock Option Induce Risk-Taking Firm Behaviors?References; 4 Related Studies of Corporate Diversification; Abstract; 4.1 Theories of Corporate Diversification; 4.2 Negative Effects of Corporate Diversification; 4.3 Reexamination of the Diversification Discount; 4.4 Corporate Governance and Corporate Diversification; References; 5 Corporate Diversification of Japanese Firms; Abstract; 5.1 How Can I Determine the Actual Conditions of Corporate Diversification?; 5.2 Corporate Diversification and Division of Corporations in Japanese Firms; Reference.
  • 6 Empirical Analyses of Corporate Diversification and Division of CorporationsAbstract; 6.1 Hypotheses; 6.2 The Empirical Analysis: A Comparison Between Consolidated Financial Statements and Non-consolidated Financial Statements for Corporations Which Have Conducted Corporate Diversification and Division of Corporations; 6.3 The Empirical Analysis: A Comparison Between Firms with Consolidated Subsidiaries and Those Without; 6.4 The Empirical Analysis: Analysis Based on Segmental Information; 6.5 The Empirical Analysis: Analysis of Pure Holding Companies; References.
  • 7 Main Results and Their InterpretationAbstract; References; Appendix Tables: Basic Statistics for Major Parameters of the Black-Scholes Model; Appendix A: All Listed Firms; Appendix B: Listed Firms of the First Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange; Appendix C: Listed Firms of the Second Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange; Appendix D: Listed Firms of the Mothers Section of the Tokyo Stock Exchange.