Review by Choice Review
During the last decade or so, philosophers' interest in the topic of attention has grown remarkably. Much work has focused on the relation between consciousness and attention, usually framed in terms of the twin questions of whether attention is necessary and/or sufficient for consciousness. Every possible answer has been entertained. A main strength of this book is its significant refinement of this issue. Instead of presenting a bare dichotomy, Montemayor (philosophy, San Francisco State Univ.) and Haladjian (psychology, Univ. of Sydney, Australia) attempt to show a wide range of dissociation between consciousness and attention--they replace a polar opposition with a spectrum. Marshaling an array of empirical results and a wide knowledge of philosophical work, the authors make a strong case for the spectrum view. That said, they leave the overall question of the relation of consciousness to attention in a rather murky state. In some places, they hold that attention is not necessary for consciousness; in others, they seem to claim the opposite. Perhaps this reflects a real multiplicity in the forms of attention that stand in diverse relations to consciousness. It may also reflect the still-deep ignorance, scientific and philosophical, about both of attention and consciousness. Summing Up: Recommended. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty. --William Seager, University of Toronto
Copyright American Library Association, used with permission.
Review by Choice Review