Consciousness and fundamental reality /
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| Author / Creator: | Goff, Philip, 1978- author. |
|---|---|
| Imprint: | New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2017] |
| Description: | xiv, 290 pages ; 25 cm. |
| Language: | English |
| Series: | Philosophy Of Mind Philosophy of mind series. |
| Subject: | |
| Format: | Print Book |
| URL for this record: | http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11315906 |
Table of Contents:
- Acknowledgments
- 1. The Reality of Consciousness
- 1.1. The Big Picture
- 1.1.1. The Datum of Consciousness
- 1.1.2. Science and Metaphysics
- 1.1.3. The Philosophical Foundations of Physics
- 1.2. Physicalism and Russellian Monism
- 1.2.1. Physicalism
- 1.2.2. Ruisellian Monism
- Part I. Against Physicalism
- 2. What Is Physicalism?
- 2.1. The Nature of Physicality
- 2.1.1. A Priori and A Posteriori Definitions of the Physical
- 2.1.2. Hempel's Dilemma and Physics-Based Responses to It
- 2.1.3. Pure Physicalism
- 2.1.4. Naturalism and Value-Laden Causal Explanations
- 2.1.5. Against A Posteriori Definitions of the Physical
- 2.1.6. Definitions of Physicality and Materiality
- 2.2. The Nature of Fundamentally
- 2.2.1. Constitutive Grounding and the Free Lunch Constraint
- 2.2.2. Grounding by Analysis
- 2.2.3. A Grounding Account of Physicalism
- 2.2.4. Alternatives to Grounding Accounts of Fundamentality
- 2.2.4.1. Accounts of Fundamentally in Philosophy of Mind
- 2.2.4.2. Accounts of Fundamentality in Metaphysics
- 3. The Knowledge Argument
- 3.1. Black and White Mary
- 3.2. Responses to the Knowledge Argument
- 3.2.1. The No-Compromise Response
- 3.2.2. Non-Propositional Knowledge Responses
- 3.2.3. The New Truth/Old Property Response
- 3.3. Transparency and Opacity: The Moral of the Story
- 4. The Conceivability Argument
- 4.1. Conceivability Arguments
- 4.1.1. Ghosts and Zombies
- 4.1.2. Clarifying Conceivability
- 4.2. Type-A and Type-B Physicalism
- 4.3. Moving from Conceivability to Possibility
- 4.3.1. The Two-Dimensional Conceivability Principle
- 4.3.2. Against the Two-Dimensional Conceivability Principle
- 4.3.3. The Transparency Conceivability Principle
- 5. Revelation and the Transparency Argument
- 5.1. Revelation and Transparency
- 5.2. The Case for Revelation
- 5.3. Can the Physicalist Account for Super-Justification?
- 5.4. Full and Partial Revelation
- 5.5. The Conceivability Argument and the Transparency Argument
- 5.6. The Dual Carving Objection
- Part II. Russellian Monism: An Alternative
- 6. The Elegant Solution
- 6.1. Impure Physicalism and Russellian Monism
- 6.1.1. The Austerity Problem
- 6.1.2. Against Causal Structuralism
- 6.1.3. Introducing Impure Physicalism
- 6.1.4. Introducing Russellian Monism
- 6.1.5. The Distinction between Russellian Monism and Physicalism
- 6.1.6. The Transparency Argument against Physicalism
- 6.2. Varieties of Russellian Monism
- 6.2.1. Constitutive and Emergentist Forms of Russellian monism
- 6.2.2. The Causal Exclusion Problem
- 6.2.3. Panqualityism
- 6.2.4. A Promising View
- 7. Panpsychism versus Panprotopsychism and the Subject-Summing Problem
- 7.1. The Threat of Noumenalism
- 7.2. The Simplicity Argument for Panpsychism
- 7.3. The Subject-Summing Problem
- 7.3.1. James's Anti-Subject-Summing Argument
- 7.3.2. The Anti-Subject-Summing Conceivability Argument
- 7.3.2.1. The Argument
- 7.3.2.2. Fusionism and the Anti-Subject-Summing Conceivability Argument
- 7.3.2.3. The Ignorance Response
- 7.3.2.4. The Consciousness + Response
- 7.3.2.5. The Spatial Relations Response
- 7.3.2.6. The Gap Is Here to Stay
- 7.3.3. Coleman's Anti-Subject-Summing Argument
- 8. Top-Down Combination Problems
- 8.1. The Palette Problem
- 8.1.1. The Strong Palette Problem
- 8.1.2. The Mild Palette Problem
- 8.2. The Structural Mismatch Problem
- 8.3. The Subject Irreducibility Problem
- 9. A Conscious Universe
- 9.1. Grounding by Subsumption
- 9.1.1. Grounding by Subsumption of Experiences
- 9.1.2. Grounding by Subsumption of Hue, Saturation, and Lightness in Color
- 9.1.3. Grounding by Subsumption of Properties in States of Affairs
- 9.1.4. Grounding by Subsumption of Regions of Space in the Whole of Space
- 9.1.5. What Is an Aspect?
- 9.1.6. Free Lunch without Analysis
- 9.2. Subject-Subsumption and the Decombination Problem
- 9.3. Constitutive Cosmopsychism
- 9.3.1. Does Cosmopsychism Require Brute Laws?
- 9.3.2. The Revelation Argument
- 9.3.3. Sharing Thoughts with the Cosmos
- 9.4. Emergence or Constitution?
- 9.5. The Incredulous Stare
- 10. Analytic Phenomenology: A Metaphysical Manifesto
- 10.1. The State of Contemporary Metaphysics
- 10.2. A Way Forward for Metaphysics
- 10.3. A Phenomenological Argument for Presentism
- 10.4. Analytic Phenomenology
- Bibliography
- Index
