Knowledge as acceptable testimony /

The thesis of this book is clear from the title: it argues that for a belief to count as knowledge, it must be not only true but also justified in the sense of being acceptable according to social norms for holding beliefs. This may sound reasonable and almost trivial, but in post-Gettier epistemology it constitutes a subtly new position in the game of capturing that will-o'-the-wisp "knowledge." Reynolds (Arizona State Univ.) makes his case with lucid, evenhanded arguments, comparing his position to previous theories and trying to counter anticipated objections. Though the book is well referenced in general, the coverage of relevant literature is imperfect: this reviewer could find only two brief, inadequate references to contextual views on epistemic norms (according to which the relevant standards for justification, and hence knowledge, differ according to the pragmatic risks of error, e.g., the street corner "what's the time?" versus the nuclear reactor engineer's "is it safe?")--an odd lacuna given the obvious relevance of such contexts to social norms for acceptable belief or assertion. Nevertheless, this is probably a useful addition to the literature. Summing Up: Recommended. With reservations. Upper-division undergraduates through faculty. --Scott E. Forschler, independent scholar