Responsibility : the epistemic condition /

Responsibility : the epistemic condition /

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Bibliographic Details
Edition:	First edition.
Imprint:	Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2017. ©2017
Description:	viii, 301 pages ; 25 cm
Language:	English
Subject:	Responsibility. Virtue epistemology. Responsibility. Virtue epistemology.
Format:	Print Book
URL for this record:	http://pi.lib.uchicago.edu/1001/cat/bib/11335046

Hidden Bibliographic Details
Other authors / contributors:	Wieland, Jan Willem, editor. Robichaud, Philip, editor.
ISBN:	9780198779667 0198779666
Notes:	Includes bibliographical references and index.
Summary:	Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars. This volume sets the agenda. Sixteen new essays address the following central questions: Does the epistemic condition require akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignorance sustained by one's culture excuse? Does the epistemic condition involve knowledge of the wrongness or wrongmaking features of one's action? Is the epistemic condition an independent condition, or is it derivative from one's quality of will or intentions? Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty? Are there different kinds of moral responsibility and thus multiple epistemic conditions? Is the epistemic condition revisionary? What is the basic structure of the epistemic condition?

Description
Summary:	Philosophers have long agreed that moral responsibility might not only have a freedom condition, but also an epistemic condition. Moral responsibility and knowledge interact, but the question is exactly how. Ignorance might constitute an excuse, but the question is exactly when. Surprisingly enough, the epistemic condition has only recently attracted the attention of scholars. This volume sets the agenda. Sixteen new essays address the following central questions: Does the epistemic condition require akrasia? Why does blameless ignorance excuse? Does moral ignorance sustained by one's culture excuse? Does the epistemic condition involve knowledge of the wrongness or wrongmaking features of one's action? Is the epistemic condition an independent condition, or is it derivative from one's quality of will or intentions? Is the epistemic condition sensitive to degrees of difficulty? Are there different kinds of moral responsibility and thus multiple epistemic conditions? Is the epistemic condition revisionary? What is the basic structure of the epistemic condition?
Physical Description:	viii, 301 pages ; 25 cm
Bibliography:	Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN:	9780198779667 0198779666